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1 
CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY 
REVIEW OF CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP 
Scott Burris,* Michael Kempa,** and Clifford Shearing*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More and more scholars and activists are talking about governance, 
but the literature is “numerous, diverse and fragmented, and has not 
formed any consistent tradition.”1  The move to governance seems 
broadly to reflect the view that paradigms like “regulation” or the 
“Westphalian” system in international relations are no longer capacious 
enough to generate useful theory or guide the humane practice of social 
control.2  There is widespread agreement that governance is important3 
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 1. Inger-Johanne Sand, Polycontextuality as an Alternative to Constitutionalism, in 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 41, 44 (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne 
Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004).  While our review is limited to material published in English, 
the concern with governance is, as this volume itself illustrates, global.  Given the size and diversity 
of the literature, our account is necessarily selective; we have aimed more to represent the 
geographic and disciplinary diversity of governance work than to exhaustively catalog any 
particular thread. 
 2. Compare, Michael Moran, Review Article: Understanding the Regulatory State, 32 BRIT. 
J. POL. SCI. 391 (2002) (categorizing major scholarly trends within a “regulation” paradigm), with 
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (tracking the emergence of a “Renew Deal” 
governance paradigm); see also David Fidler, Constitutional Outlines of Public Health’s “New 
World Order”, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 247 (2004) (discussing emergence of a new paradigm of 
international governance). 
 3. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE 
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and that it is (or ought to be) changing.4  But exactly what is 
governance?  How is it changing, what is happening to the state, and 
how are actors at various levels of social organization promoting or 
adapting to changes in governance?  The aim of this paper is to explore 
for a broader legal audience what researchers and theorists in a wide 
range of fields have made of the ferment in governance, and to identify 
important lessons for people interested in how to improve it locally, 
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1993); COMMISSION ON 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD (1995); Richard Dodgson & Kelley Lee, 
Global Health Governance: A Conceptual Review in Global Governance: Critical Perspectives 92-
93 (Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes eds., Routledge 2002);  U.N. Human Settlements 
Programme [UN-HABITAT], The Global Campaign on Urban Governance: Concept Paper (2d ed. 
March 2002), available at http://hq.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/2099_24326_concept_paper.doc 
[hereinafter UN-HABITAT]; R.A.W. RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE: POLICY 
NETWORKS, GOVERNANCE, REFLEXIVITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (Open University Press 1997); 
[hereinafter RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE]; John Braithwaite, Accountability and 
Governance under the New Regulatory State, 58 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 90 (1999); Jody Freeman, 
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The 
Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001); Jan Kooiman, 
Governance: A Sociopolitical Perspective, in PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE. POLITICAL AND 
SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS 71-72 (Jürgen R. Grote & Bernard Gbikpi eds., 2002); Goran Hyden, 
Julius Court & Kenneth Mease, Making Sense of Governance: The Need for Involving Local 
Stakeholders (Overseas Development Institute 2003), available at 
www.odi.org.wk/wga_governance/Docs/Making_sense_Governance_stakeholders.pdf; Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, Governance Structures, Legal Systems, and the Concept of Law, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
355 (2004); Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory 
State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE 
OF GOVERNANCE 145-46 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004); Jennifer Wood, Cultural 
Change in the Governance of Security, 14 POLICING & SOC’Y 31 (2004); Louise G. Trubek, New 
Governance Practices in US Health Care, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 
245-46 (G. DeBurca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom & Paul C. Stern, The 
Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907 (2003); Tony Bovaird,  Public Governance: 
Balancing Stakeholder Power In A Network Society, 71 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 217 (2005); Monica 
Blagescu & John Young, Partnerships and Accountability: Current Thinking and Approaches 
Among Agencies Supporting Civil Society Organizations (Overseas Development Institute 2005), 
available at http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Publications/Documents/WP255.pdf. 
 4. TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (Christian Joerges, Inger-
Johanne Sand, Gunther Teubner eds., 2004); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 
(2004); Kooiman, supra note 3, at 71; Peter N. Grabosky, Using Non-Governmental Resources to 
Foster Regulatory Compliance, 8 GOVERNANCE 527 (1995); Gunther Teubner, Societal 
Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3 (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther 
Teubner eds., 2004); David Post & David R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent: 
Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1055 (1998); Lobel, supra note 2; Michael C.  Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Peter J. Spiro, NGO’s in 
International Environmental Lawmaking: Theoretical Models, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 770 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey eds., 
2007); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: 
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 542 (2007). 
2
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nationally, and internationally.  We seek to link what lawyers are writing 
to a rich literature on governance theory and practice in other fields. 
Specifically, we address two main problems.  The Description Problem 
poses the question of what is the most accurate, as opposed to the 
formal, description of where governance is located and how it is 
exercised?  The Prescription Problem is how to reform or replace 
institutional forms and constraining norms that no longer perform the 
functions they once did.  In the words of Roberto Unger, legal scholars 
tend towards a kind of “institutional fetishism” in matters of governance, 
behaving as if the only institutions that can deliver the goods of good 
governance are those that have done so in the past.5  The Prescription 
Problem in this light is a challenge to practice true innovation in 
governance. 
We begin, in Part II, by canvassing definitions of governance.  Here 
there is considerable overlap, if not agreement, across fields as diverse 
as health, the environment, and international relations.  Governance may 
be defined as organized efforts to manage the course of events in a social 
system.  Governance is about how people exercise power to achieve the 
ends they desire, so disputes about ends are tied inextricably to 
assessments of governance means.  “Governance” is not synonymous 
with “good governance.”  Any given contemporary governance system 
may be inefficient, corrupt, or unresponsive to the needs of the 
governed.  Governance can be “good” in at least two senses: it can 
deliver good results and it can work through processes and institutions 
that meet broadly accepted standards of justice and due process.  Ideally 
governance is good in both of these ways, and, indeed, many people 
believe that governance that fails the second criterion normally will have 
difficulty delivering on the first. 
In Part III, we look at how scholars in a variety of fields have 
described the changes in contemporary governance.  The main theme in 
the literature is the fragmentation of state sovereignty and the 
consequent multiplication in the number of agencies and forms of power 
that are active in the management of social systems.  There is also fairly 
wide agreement that it no longer makes sense to conceive of the state as 
the monopolist of governance.  Once it was dogma that our collective 
world was divided into two fundamentally different spheres: the public 
sphere—which was the realm of governance, and the private sphere—
the realm of the governed.  This crucial distinction has eroded.  States do 
 
 5. ROBERTO UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 8-10 (Verso 1996). 
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not enjoy a monopoly on governance, and themselves are often governed 
by non-state actors. 
It now makes more sense to describe our world as polycentric, with 
multiple agencies and sites of governance that govern through a variety 
of forms of power.  Both public and private governance have substantial 
collective effects, and in both forms there are important (though 
different) kinds of democratic deficits between the stake people have in 
decisions and their capacity to influence or be protected from them.  
This is as true at the international level (where the proliferation of non-
state governing actors has been characterized as a “post-Westphalian” 
regime) as it is at the local (where resource-poor governments and non-
governmental organizations struggle to cope with the externalities of a 
global economy over which they have little or no control). Citizens are 
enlisted in new governmental and hybrid institutions to oversee 
community policing, set local budgets, and monitor public expenditures.  
Throughout the literature, there is discussion of the governing power of 
transnational corporations.  Non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) 
and foundations, though not generally as wealthy or effective as 
corporations, are also vital governors at all levels. There is no mistaking 
their expanding role in setting health priorities and providing services.  
“Dark networks,” like Al Qaida or organized crime syndicates, are also 
seen as agencies of governance. 
None of this means that states are no longer important governors.  
Many states retain decision-making powers in many spheres.  Moreover, 
states are deliberately sharing power as a means of exercising it.  Much 
of this falls under the umbrella of “partnership” approaches to 
governance, wherein the state attempts to maintain a hand on the tiller, 
steering governance processes in the public interest.  Even where states 
are not decision-makers in governance, they typically remain powerful 
transmitters and implementers of decisions made by others. 
Complexity, diversity, and particularity drive accounts of 
governance today.  The structure of governance is most commonly 
described in network terms.  Writers point to phenomena as diverse as 
the Internet, public-private partnerships, markets, informal policy 
networks at the international level, and “whole of government” 
initiatives as examples of networked governance in action.  Though 
there are differences in how the network metaphor is used, network 
accounts of governance tend to emphasize the importance of information 
flow as a means and measure of good governance.  Those that have, and 
can use, information are at a significant advantage over those that are cut 
off from information or unable to gather or use it effectively. 
4
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The fracturing of governance has led to an explosion of interest in 
the tools of governance.  Force, which the Hobbesian state was designed 
to constrain, continues to be a tool of both state and non-state 
governance.  Money is also a staple.  At the same time, scholars have 
been extremely successful in highlighting how governance may be 
accomplished through “the regulation of social meaning.”6  Information 
is proposed hopefully as a prime tool for constraining and replacing 
these traditional means of exercising power.7  New institutions and 
practices of deliberation, and better mobilization of local knowledge and 
capacity, are pursued as means of making governance systems fairer and 
more efficient. 
Our review finds that writers across disciplines consistently discuss 
three key variables of governance change and innovation: 
Shifts in the institutions exercising governance control.  There is an 
apparent shift of the locus of control as new institutions emerge and 
others decline in influence or disappear. 
Changes in the methods of power.  Governance is changing as 
governors find new ways to project power towards other governors and 
individuals in the system. 
Changes in the nature or effectiveness of constraints on governors.  
Governance systems change with variation in the potency of social 
norms, institutional checks and balances, and technologies of 
accountability and transparency. 
Governance is not just changing, but, many scholars argue, is also 
in a state of poor health.  The diagnoses of the causes of these problems 
differ, as therefore do the prescriptions for practical remedies.  Much of 
the difference in opinion hinges on expectations of the state.  Some see 
the state as too weak, and needing to be strengthened.  To others, the 
state remains too strong, too undemocratic, and therefore needs to be 
better constrained or stripped of some of its jurisdiction.  A number of 
scholars have argued that old models of governance are paralyzed, and 
 
 6. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). 
Foucault is primary source for this sort of thinking, yet one must be careful about drawing on 
Foucault in this discussion.  Most of the literature we review is frankly positivist and 
instrumentalist, devoted to governance as a tool for doing things.  The literature follows Foucault in 
his recognition of the decentralized, social character of power, but is far less attentive to the 
problematization element of Foucault’s governmentality framework.  For an excellent discussion of 
new governance from a Foucaultian governmentality perspective, see Nikolas Rose, Government 
and Control, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 321 (2000). 
 7. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE, 
ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2d. ed. 2000); Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-
Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUROP. L. J. 313 (1997). 
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need to be replaced, while some have been concerned that new modes of 
governance are increasingly exploited by the strong at the expense of the 
weak.  While it is not our purpose in this paper to offer an intellectual 
history of the recent move to governance,8 we do briefly highlight two 
fundamental critiques of state-centered governance that seem to appear 
throughout the governance literature: that “old” institutions of traditional 
state governance are no longer working very well, and that a principal 
reason for this is, as it were, epistemological—social systems have 
become too complex, diverse, and particular for centralized, top-down 
governance to manage. 
Part IV examines efforts to remake governance over the past twenty 
years.  These may be separated into two “genres” of reform, reflecting 
contrasting views of the proper, or feasible, role of the state: 
“reinvention of government” and “reinvention of governance.”  
Reinventing government consists in efforts to improve state regulatory 
capacity with new tools, mentalities and institutions. Its emblematic 
expression comes in strategies that devolve the “rowing” of governance 
(providing services) to non-state agencies, while retaining the “steering” 
(specifying the goals) within traditional state institutions.  If reinventing 
government is a matter of partnership between public and private agents, 
reinventing governance can be thought of as a divorce. Reinventing 
governance uses some of the same methods of power, but focuses on 
innovation governors that may act with little or no connection to the 
state.  The key distinction between reinventing government and 
reinventing governance seems to be the ceding of true power to non-
state actors.  New governance institutions and practices cannot flourish 
unless new governors are given real control over budgets and priorities. 
Reinventing government has had some successes, but is no panacea.  
Reinventing governance has proven to be an exciting concept, put into 
practice in a variety of interesting ways, but its broader effects remain a 
matter of debate. 
In Part V, we conclude with some critical observations about 
contemporary scholarship on governance innovation.  The most 
important question is the extent to which the reports of the death of the 
state have been exaggerated.  Much of the impetus (and, to be fair, the 
creativity) in the new governance literature comes from the claim that 
top-down, state rule is often failing, which means both that the state 
cannot be counted on to deliver crucial governance goods and that it 
 
 8.  For an ambitious attempt to do so, ignore the unfortunate coinage in the title and see 
Lobel, supra note 2. 
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really cannot stand in the way of democratic innovation.  A second 
concern has to do with the centrality of local democracy in the 
innovation literature.  Are advocates of innovation idealizing 
participatory democracy at the lowest possible level of social 
organization?  The literature often suggests as much, in spite of the well-
known perils of localism.  Finally, there is the relation of research to 
practice and the importance of implementation factors on any sort of 
governance innovation.  With a topic as complex as this, the “correct” 
description of governance in theoretical or empirical terms is an 
infinitely receding goal.  We need both theoretical and empirical tools, 
but the more important issue is the prescription: what should governance 
become and how should it get there?  In the literature we review, we see 
many examples of theory and data being moved into practice, on scales 
both large and small.  We also see too many instances of good theory 
becoming good practice—and then failing for lack of social investment 
for sustainability and scale-up. 
II. DEFINING GOVERNANCE 
There is little disagreement that governance is changing, but what 
“governance” means and what sorts of changes are occurring are not 
always specified.  Governance has become a popular topic, and so risks 
becoming a point of false rhetorical convergence, a term that means all 
things to all people.9  We begin by adopting a definition of governance 
to ground this article.10  Aiming for a level of abstraction on which we 
 
 9. Bovaird, supra note 3; Mark Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes, Searching for Civil Society: 
Changing Patterns of Governance in Britain, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 41 (2003) [hereinafter Bevir & 
Rhodes, Searching]; MARK BEVIR & R.A.W. RHODES, INTERPRETING BRITISH GOVERNANCE 
(Routledge 2003) [hereinafter BEVIR & RHODES, INTERPRETING]; Mark Bevir, R.A.W Rhodes & 
Patrick Weller, Traditions of Governance: Interpreting the Changing Role of the Public Sector, 81 
PUB. ADMIN. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Bevir, Rhodes & Weller, Traditions]. 
 10. There are many definitions of governance in many literatures.  See, e.g., Dodgson & Lee, 
supra note 3; OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 3; UN-HABITAT, supra note 3; Kooiman, supra 
note 3; COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 3.  In the broadest sense, the essence of 
modern purposive governance is captured in Guillaume de la Perrière’s famous statement in 
Mirroire Politique: “the right disposition of things, arranged so as to achieve convenient ends.”  
Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT:  STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 
94 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991) [hereinafter Foucault, 
Governmentality).  The earliest modern practitioner incarnations of the concept of “governance” 
pertained to the management of the population and economy as entities, the internal characteristics 
and processes of which were rendered conceptually available by the advent of the statistical 
sciences.  Thus, statistics made it possible for practitioners to think in terms of where the population 
or economy stood on aggregate measures (i.e. empirical "norms") and, by extension, where they 
would like these aggregates to be on the same measures (i.e., desired "ends").  "Governance" 
7
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thereby became the "rational" affair of systematic observation, policy design, implementation, 
measurement, and adjustment towards closing the gap between norms and desired ends. 
Contemporarily, "good governance" in the field of economic and social development—epitomized 
in the language and practices of such international agencies as the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization—is orientated around the twin tracks of enhancing 
the efficiency of the state administration (i.e., combating corruption and engaging "governmental 
rightsizing") coupled with so-called "second-generation reforms" to build the critical physical 
infrastructure and promote the individual skills and collective capacities necessary for the 
development of health, security, and industry under the banner of "universal human rights."  See 
Kees Van Kersbergen & Frans Van Waarden, ‘Governance’ as a Bridge Between Disciplines: 
Cross-Disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in Governance and Problems of Governability, 
Accountability and Legitimacy, 43 EUR. J. POL. RES. 143-45 (2004) Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay 
& Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters V: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 
for 1996-2005 (World Bank 2006), available at http://econ.worldbank.org (follow “Document 
Search” hyperlink; search for “Governance V Kaufmann”). 
With respect to the social sciences, governance as an object of study is approached in a variety of 
ways.  Thematically, it can be said that differences in the usage of the term are a matter of emphasis 
more than substance.  Universally, it is acknowledged that governance entails a set of both 
repressive and constitutive processes oriented towards shaping outcomes that extend beyond the 
state.  Nevertheless, commentators differ on the relative importance they assign to the state versus 
other agencies, and repressive versus constitutive forms of power, in processes of governance.  
Commentators representing different academic perspectives also differ in terms of the level at which 
they focus their analysis in keeping with the "conceptual legacy" of their particular research 
traditions.  Thus, "international relations" scholars have come to understand "governance" in terms 
of “systems of rule … that sustain mechanisms designed to ensure [a collectivity’s] safety, 
prosperity, coherence, stability, and continuance.” “[I]nternational collectivities” are not limited to 
the state or state-sanctioned international institutions but include other entities such as international 
non-governmental organizations. See James N. Rosenau, Change, Complexity and Governance in 
Globalizing Space, in DEBATING GOVERNANCE: AUTHORITY, STEERING AND DEMOCRACY, 167, 171 
(Jon Pierre ed., Oxford University Press 2000).  Another usage of the term “governance” is derived 
from the “network studies” stream of political science.  This literature tends to see governance in 
terms of the tendency of networks of governmental players to derive both formal and informal 
protocols for interactive and independent conduct through the “messy actualities” of partisan 
brokerage, and more “ideological” modes of deliberation.  See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Coping with 
Tragedies of the Commons, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 493 (1999), available at 
http://plato.acadiau.ca/COURSES/pols/grieve/3883/readings/ostrom_commons_tragedy.pdf. 
Similar themes are spoken in various streams of development studies literature.  Françoise Barten et 
al., Democratic Governance—Fairytale or Real Perspective? Lessons from Central America, 14 
ENV’T AND URBANIZATION 129, 131 (2002), for example, argue that “governance expresses the 
relationship that exists between the state and civil society with respect to problems and policies of 
national interest.”  Other authors working within this framework retain much of the flavor of 
Barten’s definition, while moving beyond the collective envelope of the nation.  Lars Kohlmorgen 
observes that governance includes “the interplay of different institutional forms ranging from public 
to private forms of regulation (with different logics of steering and action) and comprises the 
interaction of different actors (with different power resources and interests).”  LARS KOHLMORGEN, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE. THE ROLE OF THE WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD BANK AND UNAIDS 2-3 (German Overseas Institute 2005).  
Further, given that “there is not only an increase of intergovernmental and international activities, 
but also a significant [rise in] transnational activities [involving civil society and the private sector], 
we can speak of global instead of international governance . . . [which entails] the totality of 
collective regulations to deal with international and transnational interdependence problems.”  Id. 
Also very useful for our purposes is the "socio-legal" or "political sociological" treatment of the 
8
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can move across many literatures, we take governance to mean “the 
management of the course of events in the social system.”11  To the same 
end, we will reduce the complexity of governance structures to three 
main elements: institutions—organizational sites where governing 
resources are gathered and mobilized (government agencies, 
corporations, foundations, NGOs, street gangs);12 methods of power—
tools that governors use to project influence (deliberation, bribes, 
military force, claims of legitimate right to rule, forum-shifting);13 and 
constraints on governors—limitations on the freedom of action of 
 
concept of "governance" developed in the "governmentality" literature that originates in the work of 
Michel Foucault.  Rather than approaching governance as a problem to be solved, Foucaultian work 
understands the concept in terms of a conceptual category that shapes the ways in which we 
subsequently look at and attempt to engage the world. See, e.g., H.K. Colebatch, Government and 
Governmentality: Using Multiple Approaches to the Analysis of Government, 37 AUSTL. J. POL. SCI. 
417 (2002); Rose, supra note 6. 
 11. See Scott Burris, Peter Drahos & Clifford Shearing, Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTL. J. 
LEG. PHIL. 30 (2005). 
 12. See Teubner, supra note 4, at 10-13; Wayne Cameron, Public Accountability: 
Effectiveness, Equity, Ethics, 63 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 59 (2004); G. SHABBIR CHEEMA, BUILDING 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: GOVERNANCE REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2005); Vivien 
Collingwood & Louis Logister, State of the Art: Addressing the INGO ‘Legitimacy Deficit’, 3 POL. 
STUD. REV. 175 (2005); M. Shamsul Haque, Governance and Bureaucracy in Singapore: 
Contemporary Reforms and Implications, 25 INT’L. POL. SCI. REV. 227 (2004); M. Shamsul Haque, 
Governance Based on Partnership with NGOs: Implications for Development and Empowerment in 
Rural Bangladesh, 70 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 271 (2004); THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE 
AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 4 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002); 
Spiro, supra note 4. 
 13. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Methods of Power for Development: Weapons of the Weak, 
Weapons of the Strong, 26 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 297 (2004) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Methods] 
(elaborating on the concept of “methods of power”); Spiro, supra note 4 (describing strategies used 
by NGOs in international legal fora).  Work in the field of public administration studies has been 
especially useful in describing the practical tools of governance.  See Rita Abrahamsen, The Power 
of Partnerships in Global Governance, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 1453 (2004); Bovaird, supra note 3.  
On broader theoretical issues addressing the nature and machinations of power behind tools and 
techniques of governance, see various domains of socio-legal studies: Graham Burchell, Liberal 
Government and Techniques of the Self, in FOUCAULT AND POLITICAL REASON: LIBERALISM, NEO-
LIBERALISM AND RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT 19, 22 (Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne & 
Nikolas Rose eds., 1996); BARBARA CRUIKSHANK, THE WILL TO EMPOWER: DEMOCRATIC 
CITIZENS AND OTHER SUBJECTS 2 (Cornell University Press 1999); Foucault, Governmentality, 
supra note 10, at 87-104; BARRY HINDESS, DISCOURSES OF POWER: FROM HOBBES TO FOUCAULT 
(Blackwell Publishers 1996) (cataloging dominant scholarship on the concept of power); Nikolas 
Rose, The Death of the Social? Refiguring the Territory of Government, 25 ECON. & SOC’Y. 327 
(1996) [hereinafter Rose, Death of Social]; NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING 
POLITICAL THOUGHT (1999) [hereinafter ROSE, POWERS]; Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller, Political 
Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government, 43 BRIT. J. SOC. 173 (1992); see also Pierre 
Bourdieu, Epilogue: On the Possibility of a Field of World Sociology, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A 
CHANGING SOCIETY (Pierre Bourdieu & James S. Coleman eds., Westview Press 1991) (working in 
field of “reflexive sociology”); accord PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIC WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO 
REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (University of Chicago Press 1992). 
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governors that may arise from laws (like a constitution or treaty), 
competition from other governors (as in a market), or from culture 
(social norms).14 
Much of what is meant by governance has to do with manipulating 
the elements of governance to achieve effective and efficient 
management—i.e., governance that works.  In the political science 
literature (especially that associated with the science of public 
administration), well-functioning management and control is referred to 
as the “governability” of the system.15  A system of governance that is 
high on governability is equipped with appropriate tools and capacities 
to manage itself (e.g., clear lines of information transfer) and to 
intervene effectively in various policy domains of interest (e.g., clear 
and effective legal powers, adequate and well-managed resources, etc.).  
There are on-going attempts to operationalize “good governance” in the 
sense of accountable, honest administration of state business.16 
Good governance is not merely about governability or 
management, however.  It also implies goals towards which systems are 
being directed, and so governance as a process is inextricably linked to 
 
 14. See Jean Marc Coicaud, Reflections on International Organisations and International 
Legitimacy: Constraints, Pathologies, and Possibilities, 53 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 523 (2001); RICHARD 
A. FALK, THE DECLINING WORLD ORDER: AMERICA’S IMPERIAL GEOPOLITICS (Routledge 2004); 
David Held, The Changing Contours of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context 
of Globalization, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: KEY DEBATES 17, 22 (Barry Holden ed., Routledge 
2000); Björn Hettne, In Search of World Order, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON WORLD ORDER 6, 13 (Björn Hettne and Bertil Odén eds., 2002); 
Teubner, supra note 4, at 10-13; Martin Hewson & Timothy J. Sinclair, The Emergence of Global 
Governance Theory, in APPROACHES TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THEORY 3, 9 (Martin Hewson & 
Timothy J. Sinclair eds., 1999); PETER MARDEN, THE DECLINE OF POLITICS: GOVERNANCE, 
GLOBALIZATION, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (2003); Anthony McGrew, Power Shift: From National 
Government to Global Governance? in A GLOBALISING WORLD? CULTURE, ECONOMICS, POLITICS 
128, 162-63 (David Held ed., Routledge 2000); Craig N. Murphy, Global Governance: Poorly Done 
and Poorly Understood, 76 INT’L AFFAIRS 789 (2000); John Gerard Ruggie, The United Nations 
and Globalization: Patterns in Limits of Institutional Adaptation, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 301 
(2003); Michael Zurn, Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems, 39 GOV’T. OPPOSITION 260 
(2004); John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies, 34 WORLD DEV. 884 
(2006); PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (New Press 2003); Colin Scott, Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A 
Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance, 29 J. L. & SOC’Y. 56 (2002). 
 15. Bovaird, supra note 3; Kees Van Kersbergen & Frans Van Waarden, supra note 10. 
 16. See, e.g., Daniel Kaufmann, Frannie Léautier & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance and the 
City: An Empirical Exploration into Global Determinants of Urban Performance 2-40 (World Bank 
2004); Daniel Kaufmann,  Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2004 (World Bank 2005); Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, supra note 10; Jerry 
Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance 
in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 117 (Michael Dowdle 
ed., 2006). 
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normative questions of what the governor is seeking to accomplish.  
Mussolini’s fascist regime famously made the trains run on time, but the 
ends of his government were odious.  Hence, “good governance” is not 
just governance that works efficiently, but governance that works by fair 
and open processes towards just and socially beneficial ends.17 
In much of the literature there is a strong normative preference for 
democracy as the essence of good governance.18  This reflects, in part, 
the evident virtues of democracy as a mode of governance, or at least its 
superiority to the alternatives, but as we will discuss further, it also 
arises in many cases from an empirical proposition: modes of decision-
making that enroll more diverse knowledge, and are subject to validation 
of analyses through competition, are more likely to produce correct 
answers more of the time.19 
Much writing on governance is devoted to questions of its ends, 
and, conversely, judgments about ends frequently influence assessments 
of effectiveness in governance.20  Thus, for example, the imposition of 
structural adjustment, or other rigorous policies aimed at promoting 
long-term socioeconomic improvement, is seen by its proponents as the 
 
 17.  Mashaw, supra note 16; Jens Steffek, Sources of Legitimacy Beyond the State: A View 
from International Relations, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 81-82 
(Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sands & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004)  (“International governance 
is likely to be regarded as legitimate when it is directed towards the agreed values of the 
international community, and when it respects commonly shared procedural standards.”); cf. 
Mashaw, supra note 16, at 117 (“at base, much of the dispute about accountability is a dispute about 
what particular institutions are meant to do, not how accountable they are in the doing of it.”). 
 18. See CHEEMA, supra note 12 at 11, 16-17 (discussing the advantages of democracy, such 
as sustainability, independence of media, and quality of institutions). 
 19. See, e.g., Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7 at 319.  The idea of “enrollment” of governors is 
an important topic in contemporary regulatory analysis.  See Julia Black, Enrolling Actors in 
Regulatory Systems: Examples from UK Financial Services, PUB. L. 2003, at 63. 
 20. This is especially the subject matter of normative political theory.  See, for example, 
Jürgen Habermas, who explicitly connects the question of norms to institutional design.  See 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION VOLUME 1: REASON AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) [hereinafter 
HABERMAS, VOLUME 1]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION VOLUME 
2: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 60-62 (Thomas McCarthy 
trans., Beacon Press 1987) [hereinafter HABERMAS, VOLUME 2]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN 
FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (MIT 
Press 1996) [hereinafter HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE 
INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greif eds., 
MIT Press 1998) [hereinafter HABERMAS, STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY]; see also SEYLA 
BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICAL THEORY 
(Columbia University Press 1986); Boris Frankel, Confronting Neo-Liberal Régimes: The Post-
Marxist Embrace of Populism and Realpolitik,  226 NEW LEFT REV. 57 (1997); WILL KYMLICKA, 
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (Oxford University Press 
1998); Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, supra note10, at 156-60. 
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epitome of good governance—willingness to impose short term pain for 
long term gain—while its opponents see the archetype of unfair and 
damaging top-down rule-making by outsiders.21  Canvassing, let alone 
resolving, these sorts of ultimately substantive debates is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
III. WHO GOVERNS AND HOW? DESCRIBING CONTEMPORARY 
GOVERNANCE 
Despite differences in conceptual emphasis across the literature, it 
is widely agreed that we are living in times of profound governance 
transformation as a matter of empirical fact.22  The main theme to which 
all the transformations in governance that we describe are ultimately 
reducible is the fragmentation of state sovereignty and the consequent 
multiplication of agencies and forms of power that are active in the 
management of social systems.  Once it was dogma that our collective 
world was divided into two fundamentally different spheres: the public 
sphere—the realm of governors, and the private sphere—the realm of 
the governed.  This crucial distinction is no longer accepted as an 
accurate representation of the way things are.23  Much of the impetus 
behind the current interest in governance seems to be a sense that the 
normative goals that (in theory) once animated a state-centered account 
of governance—equity, stability, accountability, transparency, 
efficiency—are ever further from being achieved, making it important to 
consider whether other descriptions of governance might guide us 
towards governance practices that produce better results.24 
There is also fairly wide agreement that the state-centered system of 
governance has been replaced by some form of distributed governance, 
in which governance power is spread among a wide range of actors of 
 
 21. See, e.g., TITUS ALEXANDER, UNRAVELLING GLOBAL APARTHEID: AN OVERVIEW OF 
WORLD POLITICS (Polity Press 1996); NOAM CHOMSKY, 9-11 (1st ed. 2001); Jonathan Di John, 
Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in Venezuela, 26 INT’L POL. SCI. 
REV. 107 (2005); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Norton & Co. 
2002). 
 22. See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; CASTELLS, supra note 7; UN-
HABITAT, supra note 3. 
 23. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; UN-HABITAT, supra 
note 3. 
 24. On how our concepts are failing our normative objectives, see Clifford Shearing, 
Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, in DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND 
THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY 11, 20-23 (Jennifer Wood & Benoît Dupont eds., Cambridge 
University Press 2005);  S.T. Akindele,  The Concepts of Democracy and Governance: A 
Theoretical and Empirical X-Ray of Their Linkage and Practical Application Within the Nigerian 
Political Landscape, 6 J. SOC. SCI. 173 (2002); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4. 
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many different types.25  Very often the metaphor of the network is used 
to capture the imagery of diffuse systems of governance involving 
multiple nodes that interact in a wide variety of ways.26  The unity of the 
network metaphor, however, masks diversity in how the concept is being 
used across a range of literatures.27  The fracturing of governance has 
likewise led to an explosion of interest in unpacking the tools of 
governance—the means (ranging from controlling resource and 
information flows to influencing culture through setting the abstract 
terms for debate) through which governing decisions can be influenced 
and effectuated.28 
The harmony in the literature in acknowledging profound shifts in 
the ways in which governance is organized and delivered goes sour on 
the question of what these agreed changes mean in terms of their origins 
and practical impacts, and whether they are positive or not.  Few think 
the state is in any danger of disappearing, and fewer still that the 
disappearance of the state would be a good thing.29  Many who 
 
 25. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 2, at 344-45 (describing changes in the global political 
economy that militate toward a new paradigm of governance); Black, supra note 19, at 64-66 
(describing the emergence of a “decentred” account of regulation); James N. Rosenau, Governing 
the Ungovernable: The Challenge of a Global Disaggregation of Authority, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 
88, 89 (2007) (discussing “proliferation of spheres of authority”). 
 26. See CASTELLS, supra note 7 (discussing the “network society”); Burris, Drahos & 
Shearing, supra note 11 (discussing “nodal governance”).  On “networked governance,” see Bevir 
and Rhodes, Searching, supra note 9; BEVIR AND RHODES, INTERPRETING, supra note 9; Bevir, 
Rhodes & Weller, Traditions, supra note 9. 
 27. For a discussion of this point, see L. Johnston & Clifford Shearing, Models of 21st-
Century Security Governance: Reflections on the Fallacy of Nodal-Network Equivalence (Draft, 
cited with permission). 
 28.  See, e.g., Braithwaite, Methods, supra note 13 (describing “methods of power” weak states 
can use to regulate powerful ones); Jane E. Fountain, Toward a Theory of Federal Bureaucracy for 
the Twenty-First Century, in GOVERNANCE.COM: DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 117 
(E.C. Kamarck, and J. Joseph S. Nye ed., 2002) (describing changes in ideal bureaucratic strategy 
flowing from new information technologies).  On the forms of power contests that are waged 
between participants in networked practices of governance, see BEVIR & RHODES, INTERPRETING, 
supra note 9.  For a similar analysis of power flows within nodal assemblages, see Benoît Dupont, 
Power Struggles in the Field of Security: Implications for Democratic Transformation, in 
DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY 86 (Jennifer Wood & Benoît Dupont 
eds., 2006).  For a generic discussion on the modalities of power that actors mobilize in order to 
contest and shape governance (as well as broader social “outcomes”), see BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, 
supra note 13.  For the more specific analysis of constitutive forms of power that colonize the mind 
to produce citizens of various sensibilities, and the “governmentality scholars” that have drawn 
upon the social theory of Michel Foucault to analyze the character of neoliberal programs of 
“governance at-a-distance,” see Rose, Death of Social, supra note 13; ROSE, POWERS, supra note 
13; Burchell, supra note 13. 
 29. For example, in the policy domain of policing, see Ian Loader & Neil Walker, Necessary 
Virtues: The Legitimate Place of the State in the Production of Security, in DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY 
AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY 165 (Jennifer Wood & Benoît Dupont eds., 2006); Lucia 
Zedner, Too Much Security? 31 INT’L. J. SOC. L. 155 (2003).  See generally Adam Crawford, 
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document the weakness or failure of the state look to strengthening the 
state, or state-based international institutions, as the response.30  
Conversely, there is widespread concern that distributed governance 
systems are being dominated by actors with greater resources to 
recognize and game new governance structures to suit their own (short-
term, we would argue) ends.  We canvas these points in this section. 
A. The King is Dead 
Ever since Thomas Hobbes, the state has figured for many thinkers 
on governance as the one essential decision-maker and coordinator, the 
one center of governance that could pacify the war of all against all 
through the application of repressive sovereign force.31  This set of 
rhetorical aspirations reached its institutional apotheosis in the middle 
decades of the 20th century, but has been in accelerating decline ever 
since.32  Indeed, it is now seen as a grossly inaccurate caricature, both of 
who does governance and how governance is done.33  In the context of 
accelerating movement of information, capital, and people in globalizing 
times, the primary envelope of collectivization has ceased to be the state: 
all manner of non-state spaces (both real and virtual) have opened up 
and expanded, presenting challenges and opportunities for governance 
that have been seized by non-state actors.34  It is not simply that the 
 
Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State?  Steering, Rowing and Anchoring the 
Provision of Policing and Security, 10 THEORETICAL CRIMINOL. 449 (2006) (analyzing how new 
governance literature assesses the state of the state). 
 30. See Loader & Walker, supra note 29; IAN LOADER & NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING 
SECURITY (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
 31. See HINDESS, supra note 13.  For many scholars, the public-private distinction has never 
described reality; it has always been an inspirational, rather than an empirical, distinction.  See 
Michael Kempa, Philip Stenning & Jennifer Wood, Policing Communal Spaces: A Reconfiguration 
of the ‘Mass Private Property’ Hypothesis, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL.  562 (2004); Andrew Von Hirsch 
& Clifford Shearing, Exclusion From Public Space, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 77-96 (Andrew Von Hirsch, David Garland & Alison Wakefield 
eds., 2000); see also Dietz, supra note 3, at 1907 (noting that the simple dichotomy between central 
government control and property rules ignores a long tradition of governing commons through 
social institutions).  However, this observation should not be used to blind us to the fact that there 
has been meaningful change in governance practice that directly relates to both the empirical and 
the inspirational value of the public-private distinction. 
 32. See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 4, at 13-15 (discussing the significance of globalization for 
governance). 
 33. Id.; Abrahamsen, supra note 13; CASTELLS, supra note 7; RHODES, supra note 3; Lobel, 
supra note 2. 
 34. Centre for Globalisation and Governance, Global Health Governance: Institutional 
Change and the Interfaces Between Global and Local Politics in the Poverty-Oriented Fight of 
Diseases, German Overseas Institute (2004-05) (prepared by Wolfgang Hein et al.,) [hereinafter, 
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public and private spheres have become blurred or that there are now 
hybrid spheres.  The distinction itself is no longer valid.  Rather than 
living in a world in which states exercise a monopoly on governance in 
the public interest, we now live in an unmistakably polycentric world 
with multiple agencies and sites of governance.  Such agencies and sites 
govern through a variety of forms of power, and largely in their own 
interests, but with far-reaching collective impacts.  In the most dramatic 
instances, private corporations may, for all intents and purposes, be the 
government in some communities.35  More commonly, non-state actors 
are simply important competitors for governing control, able in many 
instances to manage events in their own interests, and in some instances 
to do so through the governance of states themselves.36  Even the state 
no longer stands as a unitary Leviathan, but is itself seen as an 
assemblage of nodes or networks working with more or less 
independence, and frequently at cross-purposes or loggerheads.  In the 
name of reinventing government, the state may be in the business of 
actively shedding governance authority to non-state or hybrid bodies.37 
The impetus for new governance paradigms is the fear that a 
continued focus upon the state and the mechanisms of repressive 
sovereign authority is undermining our ability to govern effectively in a 
whole variety of domains,38 including the environment,39 international 
 
Institutional Change and Interfaces]; KOHLMORGEN, supra note 10; Eeva Ollila, Global Health 
Priorities—Priorities of the Wealthy? 1 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH (2005). 
 35. See, e.g., Amy Sinden, Harms Power and Responsibility: Why Human Rights Should 
Address Corporate Environmental Wrongs, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom 
Campbell eds., 2007) (describing governance by Texaco and Freeport-McMoran in extraction 
reserves). 
 36. For example, Orly Lobel describes the current terrain of governance as characterized by: 
increased participation of nonstate actors, stakeholder collaboration, diversity and 
competition, decentralization and subsidiarity, integration of policy domains, flexibility 
and noncoerciveness, adaptability and dynamic learning, and legal orchestration among 
proliferated norm-generating entities. The challenge is to understand these dimensions of 
the new legal model as operating together, along with the contingencies and internal 
debates over meaning and bricolage that inevitably arise in an emerging school of 
thought.   
Lobel, supra note 2, at 348, 371-404. 
 37. See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 3 (discussing transnational networks of state agencies); 
Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11 (describing governments as nodal assemblages); Colin 
Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J. L. & SOC’Y 38 (2000) (mapping accountability 
structures in government). 
 38. B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, supra note10. 
 39. Thierry Desrues, Governability and Agricultural Policy in Morocco: Functionality and 
Limitations of the Reform Discourse, 10 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 39 (2005); Andrew E.G. Jonas & 
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development,40 and health.41  In the international relations literature, for 
example, commentators have proposed the emergence of a “post-
Westphalian” era in which international governance is no longer a club 
reserved for states.42  International NGOs, such as Amnesty 
International, are able to mobilize popular opinion against particular 
states to constrain and shape state action by issuing reports that they 
systematically amplify through their access to global information 
media.43  In some instances, NGOs effectively participate in 
international state governance by providing expert “diplomats” to 
represent weak states in international negotiations.44  Transnational 
corporations wield both political power within states and the weight of a 
threat to move capital.  Such capital movement influences global policy 
and constrains individual states from pursuing autonomous 
socioeconomic and environmental policy agendas that are unfriendly to 
the maximization of corporate profits.45  The World Health Organization 
(“WHO”), one of the weakest international agencies, was able to govern 
China’s response to SARS because of its ability to enroll the global 
media to spread the word which in turn spurred global businesses to 
withhold investment.46  None of this is fully comprehensible within a 
paradigm of exclusive state governance in the international sphere.47 
 
Gavin Bridge, Governing Nature: The Re-Regulation of Resources, Land Use Planning, and Nature 
Conservation, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 958 (2003). 
 40. Mamadou Diawara, Globalization, Development Politics, and Local Knowledge, 15 INT’L 
SOC. 361 (Maria Arnason trans., 2000). 
 41. Ilona Kickbusch, Action on Global Health: Addressing Global Health Governance 
Challenges, 119 PUB. HEALTH 969 (2005); Jon Cohen, The New World of Global Health, 311 SCI. 
162 (2006); Ilona Kickbusch, Mapping the Future of Public Health: Action on Global Health, 97 
CANADIAN J. PUB. HEALTH/REVUE CANADIENNE DE SANTE PUBLIQUE 6 (2006). 
 42. See, e.g., Fidler, supra note 2; STIGLITZ, supra note 21. 
 43. Peter Leigh Taylor, In the Market But Not of It: Fair Trade Coffee and Forest 
Stewardship Council Certification as Market-Based Social Change, 33 WORLD DEV. 129 (2005); 
Spiro, supra note 4; Kal Raustiala & Natalie Bridgeman, Nonstate Actors in the Global Climate 
Regime,  UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 07-29 Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028603. 
 44. See Spiro, supra note 4. 
 45. For example, state government policies throughout Southern Africa have been turned in 
the direction of conditions favorable for the maintenance of the primary resource extraction 
economy most beneficial for major transnational corporations.  Elias K. Bongmba, Reflections on 
Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance, 30 J. S. AFR. STUD. 291 (2004); Pádraig Carmody, Between 
Globalisation and (Post) Apartheid: The Political Economy of Restructuring in South Africa, 28 J. 
S. AFR. STUD. 255 (2002). 
 46. Jason Sapsin et al., SARS and International Legal Preparedness, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 155 
(2004); Jacques deLisle, Atypical Pneumonia and Ambivalent Law and Politics: SARS and the 
Response to SARS in China, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 193 (2004). 
 47. See Chief Emeka Anyaoku, The End of Multilateralism: Whither Global Governance? 93 
THE ROUND TABLE 193 (2004); Chimni, supra note 38; Ruggie, supra note 14; Zurn, supra note 14. 
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The eclipse of the Leviathan is seen with equal clarity at the local 
level.  A much discussed example is the proliferation of “mass private 
property” and other forms of new communal space that look like 
traditional public spaces, but are privately owned and regulated.  These 
spaces include malls, golf courses, theme parks, and secured corporate 
and residential complexes and towers.48  Owners of such property take 
full advantage of the legal rights that accrue to property ownership—and 
of the inapplicability of constitutional limitations on action that apply 
only to public authorities—to set and enforce behavior and surveillance 
standards within the space they own.49  This has seen the explosion in 
the size and role played by the paid private security industry globally 
over the last three decades.50  These agencies have become the dominant 
force in the process of “the governance of security” at the local and 
international levels over this time period, which has seen much of the 
business of “policing” turn directly in service of the interests of 
wealthier classes.51  Of great import is the fact that private security 
agencies often mobilize the public police to do their bidding.  Absent 
such an invitation, the nature of private property law makes it difficult 
for the public police to enter and intervene.  Thus, in an important sense, 
the public police are themselves governed by the private security 
industry and their employers in the expanses of mass private property 
that dot the contemporary landscape. 
As the above examples illustrate, it is not just that the state now 
shares governance with “private” actors in policy networks that remain 
 
 48. Clifford Shearing, and others, have told the story of how shopping districts on public 
streets morphed into malls that gradually refashioned themselves from public squares to “mass 
private property”—a form of space that admits the public, but on terms set by the owner.  A recent 
refinement is the creation of local business improvement districts in the old shopping areas; these 
“private” authorities have the power to tax and field their own police, among other state-like 
functions.  Shearing, supra note 24. 
 49. Kempa et al., supra note 31; Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 31. 
 50. TERESA P. R. CALDEIRA, CITY OF WALLS: CRIME, SEGREGATION, AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
SAO PAULO (University of California Press 2000); Teresa P. R. Caldeira, Building Up Walls: The 
New Pattern of Spatial Segregation in Sao Paulo, 48 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 55 (1996); Kempa et al., 
supra note 31; Clifford Shearing & Phillip Stenning, Private Security: Implications for Social 
Control, 30 SOC. PROBLEMS 493 (1983) [hereinafter Shearing & Stenning, Private Security]; 
Clifford Shearing & Phillip Stenning, Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications, in 
CRIME AND JUSTICE, AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH, VOL. 3 193-245, (Michael Tonry & 
Norval Morris eds., 1981) [hereinafter Shearing & Stenning, Modern Private Security]; ALLISON 
WAKEFIELD, SELLING SECURITY: THE PRIVATE POLICING OF PUBLIC SPACE (Willan Publishing 
2003). Even the government uses private security guards, as the role of Blackwater in protecting 
American diplomats unflatteringly illustrates. Eric Schmitt & David Rohde, 2 Reports Assail State 
Dept. Role in Iraq Security, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007.  
 51. Shearing & Stenning, Private Security, supra note 50. 
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state-coordinated.  It is now recognized that the state itself is governed 
by non-state actors—which makes it possible to speak of the rise of 
“private government” in contemporary systems of governance.52  This 
highlights the analytic point that useful accounts of, and programs for 
engagement with, governance must consider the cases in which the state 
is following orders, in which it may be a transmitter, rather than maker, 
of decisions.  The fact that a government in a nodal world is 
democratically elected has, on this basis, proved to be no guarantee that 
it will realize broadly based, rather than narrowly partisan, agendas.53 
None of this means that states are no longer important.  Many states 
remain extremely potent in many spheres.  Through disseminated 
governance mechanisms, some scholars argue that the functional 
capacity of the state to direct its influence into an expanding range of 
matters of everyday life is in fact increased, with sometimes positive and 
sometimes negative results.54  What is more, repressive power has not 
been dropped from the arsenal of tools deployed by state governments in 
the process of governance.  This is especially the case where efforts to 
govern at-a-distance through the light touch of constitutive power break 
down, such as in the case of controlling hard-to-reach groups—notably 
the economic underclass of marginalized, undereducated, and thereby 
unemployable persons, persons that have no stake in conforming to, or 
supporting, the mainstream governance order.55 
In the context of growing security concerns in a post-9/11 world, 
where state governments have awoken to the apparent threat posed by an 
expanding global underclass whose ears are receptive to violent radical 
ideology, the direct use of coercive power by state authorities and 
through private proxy is increasing.56  But the end of the state monopoly 
poses the fundamental question, both theoretical and practical, of how 
 
 52. Freeman, supra note 3; STEWART MACAULEY, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (1995); 
David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 12 (2005); R.A.W. Rhodes, The Unholy Trinity and Network Governance, Public Lecture, 
Australian National University (August 2005) [hereinafter Rhodes, Network Governance speech].  
We do not begin to explore the enormous literature on corporate governance, much of which 
concerns itself with the structure and operation of private regimes of rule. 
 53. See Bovaird, supra note 3; Di John, supra note 21; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 
supra note10. 
 54. See Shearing, supra note 24, at 25 (noting that, in some important respects, the 
government has strengthened under a steering-rowing model). 
      55.   See HINDESS, supra note 13; Barry Hindess, Not at Home in the Empire, 7 SOC. 
IDENTITIES 363 (2001); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA (1995). 
 56. See Conor O’Reilly & Graham Ellison, Eye Spy Private High: Reconceptualising High 
Policing Theory, 46  BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 641 (2006). 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss1/7
BURRIS_FINAL 1/25/2008  10:29:41 AM 
2008] CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE 19 
private government is to be conducted with decent regard for the 
collective interest.  The answer to that question begins with a description 
of non-state governance. 
B. Long Live the Extended Royal Family 
States exist today as one nodal assemblage among many in an 
increasingly complex field of governance relationships and practices.  In 
the context of the fragmentation of sovereignty in globalizing times, the 
reach of such non-state actors extends beyond any type of clearly 
delimited private sphere into a wide variety of areas of collectivization 
that have broad impact on the social and physical environment.  
Governance is a multilevel affair,57 and therefore we can expect to see 
the proliferation in involvement of non-state actors in processes of 
governance at the local, national, and inter/supra-national levels of 
collectivization. 
So who else governs?  This is an empirical question that has 
received considerable attention in the literature.  The most influential 
and powerful agencies involved in contemporary governance are without 
a doubt those representing corporate power at the local, national, and 
inter/supranational levels.58  The mechanisms through which these forms 
of non-state agencies govern are most clearly spelled out in the global 
business regulation literature, which provides detailed analysis of the 
legal and cultural conditions of possibility that have enabled 
corporations to seize an increasing number of the levers of governability 
away from public authorities.  As commentators like John Braithwaite, 
Peter Drahos, Colin Scott, and David Levi-Faur have pointed out, much 
of this has turned on the creative use of private property concepts in 
contract, patent, and intellectual property law.59  For example, the Trade- 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) has rendered it 
possible for pharmaceutical conglomerates to claim patents over 
remedies derived from plants and other biotic matter, even though such 
 
 57. Institutional Chance and Interfaces, supra note 34; KOHLMORGEN, supra note 10. 
 58. Freeman, supra note 3; MACAULEY, supra note 52; Shearing, supra note 24; Bevir & 
Rhodes, Searching, supra note 9; BEVIR & RHODES, INTERPRETING, supra note 9, at 83-86;  Bevir, 
Rhodes & Weller, Traditions, supra note 9. 
 59. See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14; JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, 
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000); Scott, supra note 14; Levi-Faur, supra note 52; Moran, 
supra note 2. 
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remedies themselves are originally sourced from local indigenous 
knowledge.60 
Non-commercial NGOs are also exerting a great deal of influence 
in contemporary governance.61  Although these bodies are not directly 
state-sponsored or incorporated in the traditional sense of profit-making 
institutions, they derive substantial authority to govern states through 
their capacity to mobilize and shape public opinion through the 
publication of reports and access to the world’s media.  Examples 
include work in human rights, access to medicines, and sustainable trade 
and agriculture, all of which are kept on the global agenda by NGOs and 
NGO networks.62  Foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, with their enormous wealth, virtually have taken control of 
the agenda in certain topics.63 
In addition to autonomous activity, both corporate organizations 
and NGOs have been mobilized to participate in collective governance 
processes through mainstream partnership approaches to governance.  
The public-private partnership has been an emblematic device in neo-
liberal systems of governance that see the state attempting to govern at-
a-distance by harnessing the ordering capacity of markets and other 
autonomous local orders.  Within this framework, contributors to 
partnership governance often are authorized explicitly in law, or in 
contract, to undertake service provision functions in the public interest.64  
Often, these agencies are, at least partially, governed by the state through 
quasi-independent oversight bodies,65 but scholars have also observed 
the converse “trend, towards systematic oversight of government (akin 
to regulation) carried out by private (i.e. non-state or non-governmental) 
actors.”66  No domain of public policy has been excluded from such 
devolution of service planning and delivery: as we have mentioned, even 
in the domain of “the governance of human security,” thought in most 
liberal democratic theory to be part of the basic justification for a state, 
 
 60. Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance 
Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401 (2004). 
 61. Collingwood & Logister, supra note 12; Haque, supra note 12; Spiro, supra note 4. 
 62. See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global Governance in Intellectual Property and 
Public Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 363 (2004); 
Joanne Csete, Lessons Not Learned: Human Rights Abuses and HIV/AIDS in the Russian 
Federation, 16 HUM. RTS. WATCH (2004); Spiro, supra note 4. 
 63. See Cohen, supra note 41 (discussing the influence of the Gates Foundation in global 
health governance). 
 64. Abrahamsen, supra note 13; Freeman, supra note 3; Haque, supra note 12. 
 65. See RHODES, supra note 3. 
 66. Scott, supra note 14 (citing, e.g., the contracting out of audits of government activities to 
private auditors). 
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public authorities have engaged partnership approaches to policing in 
collaboration with local citizens and the paid private security industry 
(and have seen corporate authorities take control over their own policing 
autonomously).  The effect is that much of the “policing” today is done 
by non-state actors.67 
“Dark networks,” such as organized crime or terror syndicates, 
exert influence on contemporary governance principally through force 
and the threat of force.68  These actors powerfully contribute to the 
spread of the “risk mentality” that dominates contemporary life.  As 
scholars such as Ulrich Beck69 and David Garland70 have detailed, in the 
context of uncertain global futures and the apparent failure of science to 
deliver on the “modernist dream” of a well-administered social and 
physical environment, individuals increasingly have become fearful of 
potential and unknown harms.  In turn, these fears often are fanned 
further by politicians for partisan and electoral benefit.71  Thus, Al 
Qaeda governs the West through actual and threatened violence that 
produces both specific and generalized fear that is associated with 
xenophobic reactions that further help Al Qaeda’s cause to turn the 
balance of the planet violently against the West. 
C. What Does Distributed Governance Look Like? 
Descriptions of distributed governance have been dominated by the 
image of the network and the consequent “de-centering” of governance.  
The use of the network idea ranges considerably in analytic rigor, from 
 
 67. See Kempa et al., supra note 31; WAKEFIELD, supra note 50.  Governance scholars have 
worked to define generic elements of regulation and governance in order to separate activities from 
actors, which is essential to understanding distributed governance.  Thus, Julia Black wrote:  
[I]n challenging the notion that regulation is a uniquely or even primarily state activity, 
decentred analyses throw into question what ‘regulation’ is.  If we are to pursue the 
analysis of regulation as a form of contemporary governance a broad and non-state 
centred understanding of regulation needs to be developed.  In response, regulation is 
understood here to be the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly 
identified outcome or outcomes, and which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, 
information-gathering and behaviour-modification.   
Black, supra note 19, at 65. 
 68. Jörg Raab & H. Brinton Milward, Dark Networks as Problems, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
THEORY 413 (2003). 
 69. ULRICH BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY (Polity Press 1999). 
 70. David Garland, The Rise of Risk, in RISK AND MORALITY 48-86 (Richard V. Ericson & 
Aaron Doyle eds., 2003); David Garland, The Culture of High Crime Societies: Some Preconditions 
of Recent ‘Law and Order’ Policies, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 347 (2000) [hereinafter Garland, High 
Crime]. 
 71. Garland, High Crime, supra note 70. 
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the metaphorical to the mathematical, but the thrust is that governance 
systems can best be understood as being comprised of many more or less 
independent governors and providers that are linked in some way that 
enables them to project influence across social space.72   
Networks can be highly stable, but in the network model, there is 
also an inherent expectation of flux, with institutions being capable of 
rapidly making new connections and abandoning old ones.  As we 
discuss later, the fascination with networks also has an epistemic 
element, the belief that networks are the expression of a social 
complexity that defies comprehension by traditional, centralized, and 
government-centered forms of governance.  To illustrate the variety and 
richness of the many literatures touching on networked governance, we 
describe here several leading accounts. 
i.  The Network Society 
The most elaborate account of networks as a feature of social 
organization is found in the work of Manuel Castells.73  For him, 
networks have become the primary mode of social and institutional 
organization in conditions of “advanced information economy” and “late 
modernity.”74  In such an economy, the capacity to generate, process, 
and manage information fundamentally determines productivity and 
competitiveness, and so much of governance is centered on, and 
conducted through, the management of information flow in networks.75  
A critical feature of Castells’ work is to ponder the broader social, 
political, and economic impacts of the spread of different forms of 
information sharing networks, and his ideas have influenced scholars 
particularly concerned with governance. 
In its strongest form, the network account of social organization 
 
 72. Julia Black writes:  
[W]hat ‘networks’ are contested.  The term is used in a number of ways ranging from a 
loose metaphor to describe a constellation of actors that seem to interact in some way, 
through to being a hard-edged mode of analysis of the extent and depth of social 
interlinkages using formal mathematical modelling.  Nonetheless, networks are generally 
seen to be qualitatively different from markets and hierarchies, contracts and 
organisation, and not to be simply a hybrid form, and to possess three central 
characteristics.  These are that they involve a variety of actors each pursuing their own 
goals, between whom there are relatively stable sets of inter-relationships, and critically, 
who are dependent on one another for resources.   
Black, supra note 19, at 85 (citations omitted). 
 73. CASTELLS, supra note 7; Manuel Castells, Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the 
Network Society, 51 BRIT. J. SOC. 5 (2000) [hereinafter Castells, Materials]. 
 74. See generally CASTELLS, supra note 7. 
 75. Castells, Materials, supra note 73. 
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takes as an empirical truth the proposition that the state is not, and for a 
variety of practical reasons cannot be, a governance monopolist.  Partly, 
this is because governments are being pushed aside or bypassed.  
“Governments today are competing with private entities for power, 
influence, and representation.”76  More fundamentally, old-fashioned 
“brick and mortar” institutions cannot manage networks that are 
complex to start with and capable of rapid reconfiguration.  While 
centralized institutions have a role, “[t]he task for the architects of the 
post cold war governance system is to recognize and take advantage of 
the complex synergies between networks of actors operating at multiple 
levels of international politics.”77 
Whether this is a good or bad thing for most of the world’s 
population remains open to question.  Leaving aside for a moment the 
decisive question of network access, the literature veers between 
excitement at the potential for governance reform and the fear that the 
global “haves” will only increase their wealth and control in a network 
society.  For many, the internet is a model of new, and effective, 
network governance,78 while the story of the manipulations of 
intellectual property holders around the TRIPS agreement is the 
archetype of networked governance in the service of the rich.79  
Braithwaite, who has written the definitive account of how transnational 
corporations exploit governance networks, has argued that there is space 
for networked governance to work for the “have-nots” that can team up 
and concentrate their power.80 
 
 76. Charlotte Streck, Global Public Policy Networks as Coalitions for Change, in GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: OPTIONS & OPPORTUNITIES 121-122 (Daniel C. Esty & Maria H. 
Ivanova eds., 2002). 
 77. Peter M. Haas, Addressing the Global Governance Deficit, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 13 
(2004); Lobel, supra note 2; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4. 
 78. Post & Johnson, supra note 4; Teubner, supra note 4; see Haas, supra note 77 (discussing 
networked governance in the environment). 
 79. Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11. 
 80. Braithwaite states:  
I have become persuaded that we live in an era of networked governance.  An 
implication of this is that developing countries might jump over their regulatory state era 
and move straight to the regulatory society era of networked governance.   Developing 
states might therefore cope with their capacity problem for making responsive regulation 
work by escalating less in terms of state intervention and more in terms of escalating 
state networking with non-state regulators. 
Braithwaite, supra note 14 at 890.  .Peter Spiro provides the following example in the case of rain 
forest destruction: “Unable to influence policymaking in Brazil, local activists turned to U.S. and 
European NGOs, who in turn pressured the multilateral banks (both directly and through their own 
governments), who in turn pressured Brazil to attend to deforestation.”  Spiro, supra note 4 at 11. 
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ii.  “Whole of Government”: Networks in a Policy Framework 
Whereas Castells and those he has influenced address the flow of 
information through networks as their primary focus of analysis, an 
important group of scholars typified by Roderick Rhodes have adopted 
the network model within an institutional, policy-oriented framework.81  
This literature deals concretely with the problem of making and 
implementing policy in state-centered networks comprised of both 
public and private nodes.  Policy network analyses began by analyzing 
and categorizing the many forms of networks that could exist in terms of 
what kinds of policy domains they address, and the types of institutions 
that tend to dominate them.82  Thus, there exist multiple forms of policy 
networks in the contemporary landscape of governance: some are largely 
coordinated by public authorities, others have more minimal forms of 
state involvement, and still others are dark networks organized contrary 
to state law, in service of illegal activities.83  Turning their cacophony 
into harmonious governance is a major, if not the main, challenge for 
government. 
Of late, more emphasis in the literature has been placed on 
analyzing the internal political dynamics of policy networks, and their 
impacts in terms of how they distribute “collective benefits,” such as 
security, education, and health services.84  This literature has found 
policy networks, as they have so far developed, to generally be exclusive 
in their membership.  The networks tend to take seriously the “voices” 
(and by extension, the forms of knowledge) of their members.  
Consequently, they tend to serve the policy interests of those members.  
This raises the fear that contemporary policy networks are, for the most 
part, characterized by a lack of legal, political, and fiscal accountability.  
This characterization contributes to themes of a widening “democratic 
deficit” between “have” and “have-not” segments of the community in 
 
 81. Rhodes, Network Governance speech, supra note 52; RHODES, UNDERSTANDING 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; R.A.W. Rhodes, Policy Networks: A British Perspective, 2 J. OF 
THEORETICAL POL. 293 (1990). [hereinafter Rhodes, Policy Networks]. 
 82. See Rhodes, Policy Networks, supra note 81. Cf. Slaughter, supra note 3 (discussing 
emergence and role of policy networks in international relations). 
 83. Rhodes, id. 
 84. Ostrom, supra note 10; Rhodes, Network Governance speech, supra note 52; RHODES, 
UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; Rhodes, Policy Networks, supra note 81; Eva 
Sorenson & Jacob Torfing, Network Politics, Political Capital, and Democracy, 26 INT’L J. PUB. 
ADMIN. 609 (2003). 
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neo-liberal times.85  This is true across a range of social services, ranging 
from the environment,86 to health,87 to human security.88 
A number of scholars have worked to define appropriate 
institutional arrangements within networks to ensure effective forms of 
deliberation that lead to rational policy outcomes that serve the common 
interest.89  On the one hand, there is empirical evidence to suggest that 
there ought to be rules excluding “symbolic” and/or “emotional” 
communications from deliberation.90  On the other hand, some theorists 
have mobilized evidence indicating that including more emotional 
arguments serves an important psychological function: catharsis, it is 
argued, gives people a higher emotional stake in their agreements, 
increasing the likelihood that policy approaches agreed upon through 
deliberation will be sustainable in practice.91  What is of clear 
importance is the role of political brokerage and exchange between 
network constituents in accounting for the emergent character of policy 
forms around us. 
iii.  Nodal Governance: A Focus on the Institutions in Networked 
Governance 
The concept of “nodal” governance has emerged from diverse 
scholarship that has made networks a central element in governance 
theory.92  In contrast to accounts that highlight the structure of the 
 
 85. Sorenson  & Torfing, supra note 84. 
 86. Lorraine Elliot, Global Environmental Governance, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 54-74 (Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes eds., Routledge 2002); Ostrom, supra 
note 10. 
 87. Ollila, supra note 34. 
 88. Michael Kempa & Les Johnston, Challenges and Prospects for the Development of 
Inclusive Plural Policing in Britain: Overcoming Political and Conceptual Obstacles, 38 AUSTL. 
AND N. Z. J. CRIMINOL. 181 (2005). 
 89. See Ostrom, supra note 10; see also John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy in Divided 
Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia, 33 POL. THEORY 218 (2005); JOHN S. DRYZEK, 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS (Oxford 
University Press 2000); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE 
SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, 
SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS (2004). 
 90. HABERMAS, STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 20; HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS 
AND NORMS, supra note 20; HABERMAS, VOLUME 2, supra note 20; HABERMAS, VOLUME 1, supra 
note 20. 
 91. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (Verso 2000); Chantal Mouffe, 
Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?, 66 SOC. RES. 745 (1999). 
 92. Braithwaite, supra note 14; Jennifer Wood, Research and Innovation in the Field of 
Security: A Nodal Governance View, in DEMOCRACY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY 217 
(Jennifer Wood & Benoît Dupont eds., 2006); Drahos, supra note 60; Clifford Shearing & Jennifer 
Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New “Denizens”, 30 J. LAW AND SOC’Y 400 
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network—its web of connections—nodal governance focuses on the 
nodes—the institutions of governance—in systems of networked power: 
their internal constitutions, their cultures, their resources, and the 
strategies they use to amass and project power.  A “node” is any formal 
or informal institution that is able to secure at least a toe-hold in a 
governance network.  This definition emphasizes the role of networks in 
contemporary governance, but also that robust governance capacity 
generally requires that the point of network access be a structure that 
enables the accumulation, and directed mobilization, of resources into 
the network over time.93  In contrast to the work on policy networks, 
nodal governance accepts, without reservation, the premise that 
governance is not the sole prerogative of government, and indeed that 
the claims of right and legitimacy, bundled up with the notion of 
“government,” are themselves forms of discursive power.94 
Governing nodes take many forms, from government entities, to 
foundations and NGOs, to street gangs.  From a nodal perspective, many 
large organizations can be seen as nodal assemblages rather than unitary 
institutions.  For example, state governments are made up of many nodal 
assemblages (judiciary, legislature, executive), which are themselves 
comprised of further nodes down to the level of a local constituent or 
enforcement office.95  Messy assemblages, like states, ultimately aim to 
integrate their constituent networks.  Drahos has written extensively 
about the importance of the “super-structural node.”  This type of node 
does not integrate networks, “but rather is a structure that brings together 
actors who represent networks in order to concentrate resources and 
technologies for the purpose of achieving a common goal.”96  His work 
documents, for example, how intellectual property holders have relied 
on super-structural nodes, like the Business Software Alliance, to 
nodally coordinate patent enforcement with U.S. and European 
governments.97  Civil society organizations typically use a super-
 
(2003); Burris, supra note 11; Benoît Dupont, Security in the Age of Networks, 14 POLICING AND 
SOC’Y 76 (2004); Jan Froestad Environmental Health Problems in Hout Bay: the Challenge of 
Generalising Trust in South Africa, 31 J. S. AFR. STUD. 333 (2005); Michael Kempa et al., 
Microscopic and Macroscopic Responses to Inequalities in the Governance of Security: Respective 
Experiments in South Africa and Northern Ireland, 49 TRANSFORMATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON S. AFR. 25 (2002) (discussing a special issue on crime and policing in transition). 
 93. Dupont, supra note 92; Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11. 
 94. See Crawford, supra note 29. 
 95. This structure is what enables the sort of networked global governance arrangements 
among subordinate state nodes described by Anne-Marie Slaughter.  See Slaughter, supra note 3. 
 96. Drahos, supra note 60, at 404; Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 321 (2004). [hereinafter Drahos, Public Goods]. 
 97. Drahos, supra note 60; Drahos, Public Goods, supra note 96. 
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structural device—the coalition—to concentrate and project their power 
resources into governance.  Normatively, a nodal view de-centers the 
state.  The aim of good governance becomes not just good government, 
but the adaptation of widely accepted norms of transparency, 
accountability, and human rights for application to non-state and hybrid 
forms of governance.  
iv.  The Post-Westphalian Paradigm: Networks in Global 
Governance 
In the international relations literature, the idea of post-Westphalian 
governance has been influenced heavily by the architecture of networks.  
In particular, Anne-Marie Slaughter has emphasized the ways in which 
states, and their departments, have become fragmented into largely 
autonomous bureaucracies that are directly linked to one another, and to 
other important non-state players in international policy networks.98  
Thus, for example, the bureaucrats of the Canadian Ministry of 
Development are directly linked to their counterparts in Botswana, and 
to representatives of international development agencies, 
nongovernmental organizations, and local community leaders, all with 
minimal levels of ministerial involvement or accountability on either 
end. 
Differences in how states deal with each other are only part of the 
post-Westphalian phenomenon.  Further, as we have intimated above, 
state-backed international governance agencies, such as the U.N., are 
under serious pressure to shape their behavior to suit the preferences of 
the most powerful nation-states, corporate actors, and sometimes even 
high-profile nongovernmental organizations.99  Yet, international 
organizations also acquire new power by their capacity to project 
information into potent private governance networks.  Lawrence Helfer 
has documented the long-term success of the International Labor 
Organization in using its monitoring powers to name and shame state 
actors – even non-ratifying ones -- into compliance with treaties.100  The 
case of the WHO and the SARS outbreak in China offers another 
excellent example.101  As we have already discussed, the activities of 
 
 98. Slaughter, supra note 3; SLAUGHTER, supra note 4; Fidler, supra note 2. 
 99. Anyaoku, supra note 47; Chimni, supra note 38; FALK, supra note 14; GEORGE 
MONBIOT, THE AGE OF CONSENT: A MANIFESTO FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Zurn, supra 
note 14. 
      100.   Lawrence Helfer, Monitoring Compliance with Un-ratified Treaties: The ILO Experience, 
71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. __ (forthcoming 2008). 
 101. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Jacques deLisle, Atypical Pneumonia and 
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NGOs in the international system have contributed powerfully to the 
view that a state-based conception of international relations is 
outdated.102 
v.  The Problems of Access and Membership 
Networks make possible a global, information-based society of the 
sort Castells envisions, but he himself notes that it also creates a new 
“Fourth World”—a marginalized social class comprised of the vast 
majority of the Earth’s population. This Fourth World is relegated to 
informational black holes, cut off from the information flows that drive 
the knowledge economy.103  Niklas Luhmann argued that the worst 
calamity of contemporary society is “no longer exploitation and 
suppression but neglect.”104  Shearing writes of how gated communities 
that exist cheek-by-jowl with slum settlements in Cape Town exemplify 
a new world order in which global elites live on islands of privilege in a 
world of deprivation.105  The nodal governance writers argue that it is 
essential to identify and promote models of governance that ensure that 
all have “substantial and equal opportunities to participate directly in 
decisions that effect them.”106  This problem of “democratic deficits” has 
the potential to undermine the legitimacy of networked governance 
theory as a means of advancing democracy, and render the governance 
 
Ambivalent Law and Politics: SARS and the Response to SARS in China, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 193 
(2004).  
 102. See Spiro, supra note 4; Haque, supra note 12; Blagescu & Young, supra note 3. 
 103. See CASTELLS, supra note 7, at 19. 
 104. Niklas Luhmann, Globalization or World Society: How to Conceive of Modern Society?, 
7 INT’L REV. OF SOC.—REVUE INERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 67, 74 (1997).  Luhmann’s work, 
mediated through Teubner, has been an important influence on governance literature.  Of particular 
importance is the concept of autopoiesis, which in this context refers to the tendency of systems 
(and components of systems, like governance institutions) to become self-referential—that is, to 
reconstruct external reality in conformity with the demands of internal coherence and cohesiveness.  
Such institutions or systems cannot be open to the ideas and demands of outsiders, even when they 
appear to be. Id.; Andrew Dunshire, Tipping the Balance: Autopoiesis and Governance, 28 ADMIN. 
& SOC’Y 299 (1996); AUTOPOIESIS AND CONFIGURATION THEORY: NEW APPROACHES TO 
SOCIETAL STEERING (Roeland J. In’ T. Veld et al. eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991).  Seeing 
only what it wants to see, the institution proceeds on a self-destructive course of action in which 
each setback is interpreted as validation.  An important point emerging here is that a critical feature 
on which to evaluate any system for governance is the capacity to gather, and then process, 
information with a minimum of bias arising from the culture or interests of the governing system. 
 105. Shearing, supra note 24, at 14-15. 
 106. See Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11; NICK DEVAS, WHO RUNS CITIES? THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN URBAN GOVERNANCE, SERVICE DELIVERY AND POVERTY (1999); 
ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY (Princeton 
University Press 2004). 
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reform project an idle past-time that will never benefit the mass of the 
world’s population. 
One reaction is to consider better ways to design and manage 
networks to be inclusive.107  Thus the suggestion of 
“microgovernance”—the seeding of new governance institutions within 
excluded communities.108  More broadly, the impulse towards 
community deliberation and participatory structures in a wide range of 
activities reflects the recognition that active intervention often may be 
needed to open network societies to all stakeholders.109  Some scholars 
have tried to address exclusion from governance by breaking down 
conventional assumptions about the membership and rights of inclusion 
in networks. In contrast to notions of “citizenship” in state collectives, 
membership in contractual non-state orders has been thought about in 
terms of “denizenship,” under which stake, rather than point of origin, 
would define access to at least certain rights and benefits.110  Rather than 
classify institutions in terms of their location in the public versus private 
sphere, some authors have begun to draw functional distinctions between 
auspices, under whose authority governance is undertaken, and 
providers, who undertake the actual business of governance.111  As we 
introduced above, governance can be initiated by either state or non-state 
impetus, and, subsequently conducted by either state or non-state 
agencies—in the contemporary interlinked society, all of these forms of 
governance will have profound collective impacts.  In taking such a 
functionalist view of governing agencies, addressing these difficulties 
leads to questions about where best to locate, and how best to control, 
broader collective resources and oversight functions to ensure the 
equitable distribution of collective goods. 
 
 107. Castells certainly encourages this.  See CASTELLS, supra note 7. 
 108. Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 335 (2004); 
accord Maurits Barendrecht & Patricia Van Nispen, Microjustice (2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/paper=1022936 (describing bottom-up approach to justice services based on small, 
local institutions). 
 109. See, e.g., Leonardo Avritzer, Public Deliberation at the Local Level: Participatory 
Budgeting in Brazil (2000); Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered 
Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POL. & SOC. 73 (2001); Louise Trubek, New 
Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139 (2006). 
 110. Shearing & Wood, supra note 92; see also PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: 
AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2007). 
 111. See David H. Bayley & Clifford D. Shearing, The New Structure of Policing: Description, 
Conceptualization, and Research Agenda (National Institute of Justice 2001). 
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D. How Do Distributed Governors Govern? 
The techniques of governance have received considerable attention 
in various literatures, ranging from the social theory of Michel Foucault 
to the extensive technical literature on regulation associated with the 
Anglo-Australian school of regulatory studies.  Despite the diversity in 
these literatures, which deal at varying levels of abstraction with 
multiple levels of social organization, there is a similarity in the 
fundamental recognition of the problem of governance as managing 
complex systems in which governing power is distributed effectively 
across many more actors than can be managed by centralized command 
and control techniques.  In this section, we describe several important 
literatures on the techniques of governance. 
i.  Soft Law and “The Regulation of Social Meaning” 
“Soft law” methods depend upon the power of social and 
institutional norms, information, and transparency to mobilize voluntary 
compliance.  For states, this has the theoretical benefit of efficiently 
reserving the use of hard sanctions, or direct government command and 
control, for a few special cases.112  Non-state governors have limited 
recourse to hard law,113 so their natural realm is the softer one of 
discourse.  Social entrepreneurs have become adept at deploying 
sophisticated information strategies to influence mass opinion and 
government action.  Researchers have documented the use of many 
time-honored, and a few new, strategies that depend upon creating and 
disseminating information: shaming and other strategies that heavily 
depend on enrolling the media; product certification schemes, which rely 
on market forces to promote desired behavior;114 and new information 
and mobilization strategies that exploit decentralized media, like the 
 
 112. On the one hand, such programs for governance at a distance can be thought of as 
enhancing the capacity of the state to govern a widening sphere of social processes more effectively 
and efficiently.  On the other hand, however, other trends in the form and exercise of authority 
indicate that state governability and accountability are slipping.  The diffusion of decision-making 
authority throughout the bureaucracies of state governments can obscure responsibility, with the 
effect that ministerial accountability for governmental policy increasingly stands as a “strange legal 
fiction.”  Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, supra note 10, at 156-57. 
 113. Braithwaite, supra note 14 at 895 (discussing the potential for qui tam statutes to 
empower non-state governors). 
 114. See Spiro, supra note 4; Taylor, supra note 43; Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, 
Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1639 (2006).  Governments also use certification regimes to regulate other governments.  See, e.g., 
Julie Ayling, Conscription in the War on Drugs: Recent Reforms to the U.S. Drug Certification 
Process, 16 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 376 (2005). 
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internet and cell-phones.115  Much of their effectiveness depends upon 
the development and effective use of technical expertise concentrated in 
institutions operating at strategic nodes of advocacy networks.116 
“Soft” law is not just a project of the weak.  Braithwaite and Drahos 
extensively documented how transnational corporations use information 
and networking techniques to govern.117  For example, those who hold 
intellectual property patents now hire private agencies to search out 
evidence of piracy in software music and video, and then use the 
evidence gathered to convince the US trade authorities to threaten 
sanctions within the World Trade Organization regime on countries that 
are not exerting enough influence to stamp out counterfeiting.118  Timur 
Kuran and Cass Sunstein cite the example of how tort reform has been 
framed by agents of large corporations that have promoted the 
availability of stories of (aberrantly) large punitive damage verdicts.119 
The idea of soft law runs through a variety of new governance 
literatures.120  It has considerable resonance with the constitutive school 
of law and society scholarship, but perhaps owes its greatest debt to 
Foucault’s account of truth and systems of knowledge as themselves 
being key mechanisms of governance.121  Foucault was very concerned 
with identifying the key conditions of possibility that enabled particular 
ways of thinking about and so doing the business of governance, the 
business of personal and collective health, the business of economy, 
etc.122  Foucault set about examining overarching rationalities of 
 
      115.   See, e.g., William H. Dutton & Wan-Ying Lin, Using the Web in the Democratic Process: 
The Web-Orchestrated ‘Stop the Overlay’ Cyber-Campaign, 9 EUROPEAN REVIEW 185 (2001); 
Herman Wasserman, Renaissance and Resistance: Using ICTs for Social Change in Africa, 64 
AFRICAN STUDIES 177 (2005). 
 116. John Braithwaite has defined a set of effective strategies for weak states and non-state 
governors to use based on the successful governance efforts of the powerful.  See Braithwaite, 
Methods, supra note 13; see also JENNIFER WOOD & CLIFFORD SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY 
(Willan Publishing 2006) (applying Braithwaite’s analysis to define methods of power for the weak 
in security); Scott Burris et al., Emerging Strategies for Healthy Urban Governance, 84 J. URB. 
HEALTH 154 (2007) (applying Braithwaite’s analysis to define methods of power for the weak in 
health). 
 117. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 59. 
 118. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14; Scott, supra note 14. 
 119. See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 683 (1999) (describing how “availability entrepreneurs” can instigate 
“availability cascades” to influence policy). 
 120. See Lobel, supra note 2, at 391-95 (discussing the idea of soft law). 
 121. See Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality: An Introduction, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 
1, 8 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991). 
 122. See Foucault, Governmentality, supra note 10 (contextualizing different “acts of 
government”); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Pantheon 
Books 1978); [hereinafter FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY]; MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: 
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governance by reading primary texts across of an array of domains, such 
as doctors’ manuals, prison wardens’ records and accounts, and policing 
institutions’ texts.123  He did so with the intent to uncover commonalities 
in ways of thinking about the world and how best to govern it.  He 
demonstrates it is possible to speak of different forms of “liberalism” in 
terms of sets of beliefs, or, “régimes of truth,” about how the world 
works and why and how people act the way they do with in it, that are 
literally embedded in particular governance practices.  For Foucault, 
these overarching rationalities eventually become widespread enough to 
take on lives of their own, obscuring alternative ways to think about and 
do the business of governance.124  Thus, the rationality of liberalism of 
various stripes can be mobilized by governing actors with the view to 
attaching legitimacy to their actions and de-legitimizing other forms of 
thinking and acting.125 
ii.  Mobilization and Coordination of Diffused Knowledge and 
Capacity 
An equally influential account has conceptualized governance in 
terms of the mobilization and coordination of knowledge and capacity 
that is diffused throughout the system.  Friedrich Hayek, who premised 
his analysis of governance on the complexity of social systems and the 
inability of central planners to comprehend or effectively manage them, 
has been a seminal thinker in this approach.126  Hayek’s account rested 
on the challenge of information flow, which he contended was best 
managed through a decentralized, polycentric process exemplified by 
markets.127  His work has natural affinities with network accounts such 
 
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Vintage Books 1979) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, PUNISH]; Michel 
Foucault, Candidacy Presentation Collège de France, in ETHICS, SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH: 
ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT 1954-1984, 5-10 (Paul Rabinow ed., New Press 1997) 
[hereinafter Foucault, Candidacy Presentation]; Michel Foucault, Politics and the Study of 
Discourse, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY  53-72 (Graham Burchell, 
Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., University of Chicago Press 1991) (1968) [hereinafter Foucault, 
Politics and Discourse]. 
 123. See, e.g., Gordon supra note 121, at 3. 
 124. See id. at 7 (noting Foucault’s thesis of sovereignty as the interdependence between the 
“government of men” and the “manifestation of truth”); cf. Scott Burris, The Invisibility of Public 
Health: Population-Level Measures in a Politics of Market Individualism, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1607 (1997) (describing how market ideology renders public health invisible in policy). 
 125. See ROSE, POWERS, supra note 13; Rose, Death of Social, supra note 13; Rose & Miller, 
supra note 13. 
 126. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (W.W. Bartley 
III ed., 1988). 
 127. HAYEK, supra note 126. For an example of Hayek’s influence in contemporary analysis of 
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as Castells’,128 which centers on the fact that hierarchical, bureaucratic 
modes of organization are inadequate to the task of accommodating the 
massive amount of information that moves through networks.   
If new governance draws on Hayek for its account of decentralized 
decision-making in complex systems, it has little interest in leaving 
things to the market.  Left unregulated, better resourced nodes in a 
market network will be more successful in gaining access to, compiling, 
and making use of valuable information than poorer, weaker ones.  As 
we have noted in the work of the policy network theorists,129 the game of 
partisan politics adds the additional layer of competition between in-
groups for dominance in directing and reaping the benefits of 
governance processes.  All things being unequal, networks that are 
powerful tend to be dominated by the most powerful segments of 
society, who accomplish this largely by taking control of the flow of 
information in their favor. The remedy, if remedy there be, is to create 
more access to governance networks for the weak, and for weaker 
players to learn to use more effectively the methods perfected by the 
powerful.130 
Here John Dewey provides the inspiration: the dominant 
mechanism proposed for mobilizing change is “democratic 
experimentalism,” expressed largely through “institutional 
innovation.”131  At the local level, this may take the form of new 
institutions that provide public goods that the state seems unable to,132 or 
that give voice and collective efficacy to people that have been excluded 
in the past.133 Creative invention and reinvention of democratic 
 
governance, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups Versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek's 
Challenge to Habermas), EPISTEME (forthcoming 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/paper=956189. 
 128. CASTELLS, supra note 7. 
 129. Rhodes, Network Governance speech, supra note 52; RHODES, UNDERSTANDING 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; Rhodes, Policy Networks, supra note 81. 
 130. See Braithwaite, supra note 13; WOOD & SHEARING, supra note 116. 
 131. See Teubner, supra note 4; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4; UNGER, supra note 5. 
 132. For example, the Zwelethemba Project in South Africa is built around a micro-institution 
called the Peace Committee, which provides dispute resolution and community development 
services in informal settlements underserved by the police and courts.  See WOOD & SHEARING, 
supra note 116. 
 133. For example, the Sonagachi Project introduced a new institution—the sex worker 
collective—as an HIV prevention intervention in Calcutta in the early 1990s.  It deployed a 
mentality of worker’s rights and occupational safety among sex workers using simple community 
organization techniques like peer education.  It has grown to thousands of members, significantly 
improved sex workers relations with madams, pimps, and the police, and has been given substantial 
credit for the unusually low rates of HIV among Calcutta sex workers compared to other major 
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institutions is seen as an essential means of destabilizing systems that 
have are dominated by elites.134 
At the border between reinventing governance and reinventing 
government are participatory institutions, like the advisory bodies 
praised by Archon Fung in his work on schools and policing,135 or the 
models that Louise Trubek has described in health care.136  The work of 
people like Gunther Teubner, Michael Dorf, Charles Sabel, and Joshua 
Cohen take the approach to a higher (and more abstract) level.  
Accepting polycentricity and diffusion in the governance of complex 
systems, they call for institutional forms and practices more adapted to 
coordination than command.137  Courts, legislatures, and bureaucracies 
may remain in place, but they will be transformed.  For example, 
legislatures more frequently will define areas and methods for direct 
local deliberation, rather than make substantive rules for conduct; 
administrative agencies will work to diffuse information, rather than 
write regulations; and courts’ primary role will be to “require that 
decision-making proceed in a directly-deliberative way.”138 
iii.  Forum Shifting 
The fracturing of governance has brought one method of power—
“forum shifting”—into particularly important use.  Through forum 
shifting, changing the locus of governing control becomes a strategy.  
 
Indian cities.  See Ishika Basu et al., HIV Prevention Among Sex Workers in India, 36 J. ACQUIR. 
IMMUNE DEFIC. SYNDR. 845 (2004). 
 134. Unger, supra note 5. 
 135. FUNG, supra note 106. 
 136. Trubek, supra note 3. 
 137. See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 4 (advocating “societal constitutionalism”); Cohen & Sabel, 
supra note 7.  Dorf and Sabel put the matter like this:  
To reinvigorate our Madisonian heritage . . . we need a new model of institutionalized 
democratic deliberation that responds to the conditions of modern life.  Such a 
reconceptualization must avoid the presumptions and coyness of an immediate 
partisanship claiming to speak for a revolution that speaks for itself.  It must also resist 
the contrary rationalizing impulse that denies the possibility of all innovation by 
reducing novelty to a problem of classification in familiar categories or to new rules for 
rearranging the familiar furniture of our institutions.  The foundation of this architecture 
would be a new connection between the broad pronouncements of the legislature and the 
courts, and applications of these pronouncements to particular situations.  This 
connection would have to leave room for experimental elaboration and revision to 
accommodate varied and changing circumstances, yet credibly limit the opportunities for 
self-dealing that this very openness of necessity seems to create.   
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4, at 283-84.  Cf. Black, supra note 19 (analyzing methods of “enrolling” 
actors to act as regulators in de-centered governance systems). 
 138. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7, at 334-35. 
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Forum shifting may be defined as relocating interactions (like 
negotiation or regulation) from an institution of governance in which an 
actor encounters resistance to one where the actor is likely to achieve its 
objective.139  It happens in many ways: moving from one forum to 
another; simply withdrawing from participation or recognition of a 
governing institution or network; or pursuing the same agenda in many 
fora.140  Forum shifting has been an extremely useful tool of the 
powerful; it can also work for weaker players like cities and NGOs.  
Major intellectual property holders were pursuing a forum-shifting 
strategy when they promoted the TRIPS treaty as means of moving 
intellectual property disputes from the World Intellectual Property 
Organization to the World Trade Organization, a move that would not 
only entail new rules and new arbiters but also a new network of 
participants: whereas NGOs had some official standing and long-term 
relationships at WIPO, they were essentially excluded from the WTO.141  
Local governments are forum shifting when, for example, they file 
damages law-suits against gun makers in places where provincial and 
national legislatures have rejected gun-control regulation.142 
iv.  Functionalist Accounts: Standards, Oversight, and Enforcement 
The regulatory literature identifies three generic tasks a regulatory 
system must accomplish: (1) set standards (whether of behavior or 
outcome); (2) monitor compliance; and (3) enforce compliance upon 
those who do not obey.143  The weakening of the public-private 
distinction, and the recognition that governance is or can be distributed 
throughout a system, has allowed regulatory scholars to describe and 
prescribe regulatory schemes in which the generic elements of regulation 
are divided among or shared by many actors.144  
 
 139. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 59.  Laurence Helfer uses the term “regime 
shifting.”  Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L LAW 1 (2004). 
 140. Braithwaite, Methods, supra note 13. 
 141. Helfer, supra note 139. 
 142. David Kairys, The Cities Take the Initiative: Public Nuisance Lawsuits Against Handgun 
Manufacturers, in GUNS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 363 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., New 
York University Press 2003). 
 143. Black, supra note 19, at 167; Braithwaite, supra note 14; Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy 
and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) 
Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE 503 (2002); Robert E. Goodin, 
Democratic Accountability: The Distinctiveness of the Third Sector, XLIV ARCH. EUROP. SOCIOL. 
359 (2003); Moran, supra note 2; Scott, supra note 14 at 160. 
      144.  The metaphor of “regulatory space” has been a useful heuristic for framing the inquiry of 
how to manage nodal social behavior towards good collective ends. See Leigh Hancher & Michael 
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Government action is one model for setting standards, but there are 
many others.  Market competition between providers can perform a 
similar function; where consumers vote with their feet in search of better 
services.  State regulators traditionally monitored compliance 
themselves, but now often contract out this function.  Semi-independent 
watchdog organizations may do this work, or the state may leave 
monitoring to the organization in question itself, or some professional 
association comprised of representatives of a broader collective (i.e. 
“self-regulation”).145  With respect to enforcement, again, it is possible 
for the state to act directly, to engage the services of others to carry out 
discipline, or to leave discipline to the agency in question. 
In practice, regulation in the neo-liberal order has most often taken 
on the character of states acting directly to set standards (sometimes in 
consultation with community advisory structures), acting at a distance to 
conduct monitoring through semi-independent watchdog organizations, 
and engaging discipline only where misbehavior has been extreme.146  
This has been the norm under partnership approaches to governance 
across a range of spheres of service provision.  Under the rubric of 
reinventing government, states have sought to maintain a grip on the 
tiller steering privatized systems for governance while seeking to 
mobilize the private entities and market processes to serve the public 
interest.147 
The impact of such systems for regulation has often been poor: the 
regulation literature has confirmed that the most powerful corporate 
actors have been able to hijack weak systems of accountability in service 
of their own ends.  Some speak of the diffusion of a global system of 
regulatory capitalism in which governance is operated in the interests of 
a corporatocracy that populates power positions in government and 
industry.148  The chance of doing things differently, of opening up the 
 
Moran, Organizing Regulatory Space, in CAPITALISM, CULTURE AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 271 
(L. Hancher, and M. Moran ed., 1989); see Colin Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented 
Resources and Institutional Design, 2001 PUBLIC LAW 329 (2001). 
 145.  See, e.g., Scott Burris & Jennifer Welsh, Regulatory Paradox in the Protection of Human 
Research Subjects: A Review of OHRP Enforcement Letters, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 643 (2006) 
(describing how U.S. government devolves  primary oversight of researchers to Institutional Review 
Boards operated by regulated institutions). 
 146. See Peter N. Grabosky, Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory 
Compliance, 8 GOVERNANCE 527 (1995); Moran, supra note 2; Scott, supra note 14. 
 147. See WILLIAM D. EGGERS & JOHN O’LEARY, REVOLUTION AT THE ROOTS: MAKING OUR 
GOVERNMENT SMALLER, BETTER, AND CLOSER TO HOME (Free Press 1995); OSBORNE & 
GAEBLER, supra note 3. 
 148. Levi-Faur, supra note 52; Steve Tombs & David Whyte, Unmasking the Crimes of the 
Powerful, 11 CRITICAL CRIMINOL. 217 (2003); O’Reilly & Ellison, supra note 56. 
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business of governance to a wider range of non-state entities has so been 
harder in practice than in theory. Nonetheless, there have been some 
interesting experiences on the ground, which we discuss in the next part. 
E. Changes in Governance: A Summary 
In the cause of simplifying this diverse and useful literature, we can 
identify three kinds of governance change:  
i.  Changes in the Institutions Participating in Governance 
Governance is said to be changing both because new institutions are 
emerging to exercise power, and because there is an apparent shift of the 
locus of control from some governors to others.  The emergence of new, 
non-state institutions of governance has been documented and discussed 
throughout the literatures on governance.149  For example, the Gates 
Foundation now exercises enormous authority over the global 
governance of health, while the influence of the World Health 
Organization has waned.150  The World Bank and the World Trade 
Organization, operating under the GATT web of treaties, have taken on 
a powerful governing role, not just in international trade, but in matters 
like national standards for the environment or worker health and 
safety.151  States, however, have less control over certain aspects of 
domestic policy by virtue of joining the WTO.152   
Globalization is widely seen as increasing the ability of 
corporations to flex economic muscles in a fluid global economy.153  To 
a lesser but still important extent, NGOs like Greenpeace have become 
important players in some areas of global governance, such as the 
environment.154  At the national and local levels, shifts in governing 
control often reflect efforts to place power in the “right” hands for good 
governance.  There is a broad theme of “subsidiarity” in many 
 
 149. See, e.g., Haas, supra note 77 (environment); Rene Loewenson, Civil Society Influence on 
Global Health Policy, Annotated Bibliography on Civil Society and Health, CSI/2003/B14, (Civil 
Society Initiative, April, 2003), available at http://www.tarsc.org/WHOCSI/pdf/WHOTARSC4.pdf 
(health); Ana Hardoy et al., Governance for Water and Sanitation Services in Low-Income 
Settlements: Experiences with Partnership-Based Management in Moreno, Buenos Aires, 17 ENV’T 
& URBANIZATION 183, 190 (2005) (urban development). 
 150. Cohen, supra note 41; Fidler, supra note 2. 
 151. See KOHLMORGEN, supra note 10. 
 152. See Chimni, supra note 38. 
 153. See, e.g., DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14; Teubner, supra note 4. 
 154. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 4.  Framed in terms of agency, changes in the locus of control 
can be instigated by forum- or regime-shifting, two of the most important contemporary methods of 
power.  See Helfer, supra note 139; DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14. 
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literatures—the idea that power should be devolved to the (lowest) level 
of governance that can effectively formulate and implement policies,155 
as well as more specific activities like the development of optimal 
arrangements of metropolitan civil government156 and the 
implementation of participatory practices in areas like policing,157 
schools,158 and budgeting.159 
ii.  Changes in Methods of Power 
A second form of change frequently identified in the literature is in 
the means that governors use to project power towards other governors 
and individuals in the system.160  Dissatisfaction (justified or not) with 
traditional regulatory strategies has prompted interest in alternatives to 
traditional command and control regulation—regulation by markets (or 
deregulation),161 but also techniques of “smart regulation,”162 audit,163 
and a wide range of “rule at a distance” methods in which various forms 
of standard-setting and self-regulation are used instead of more 
command-and-control based forms.164  A great deal of the literature 
 
 155. Streck, supra note 76, at 125; see also Burris, supra note 116 (discussing localism in 
global public heath governance). 
 156. See, e.g., Christian Lefèvre, Metropolitan Government and Governance in Western 
Countries: A Critical Review, 22 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 9 (1998); Katherine M. Johnson, 
Sovereigns and Subjects: A Geopolitical History of Metropolitan Reform in the USA, 38 ENV’T. & 
PLANNING 149 (2006). 
 157. FUNG, supra note 106; Fung, supra note 109. 
 158. FUNG, supra note 106; Fung, supra note 109. 
 159. Rebecca Abers, From Ideas to Practice: The Partido Dos Trabalhadores and 
Participatory Governance in Brazil, 23 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 35 (1996); Yves 
Cabannes, Participatory Budgeting: A Significant Contribution to Participatory Democracy, 16 
ENV’T & URBANIZATION 27 (2004). 
 160. The utility of money as a method of power requires no discussion, and the use of force, 
legitimate or otherwise, is a topic in and of itself.  See Shearing, supra note 24 (discussing the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force as a core element of the state-centered governance 
paradigm). 
 161. MARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE, AND DOWNSIDE 
(John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., Brookings 2002). 
 162. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING 
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (Oxford University Press 1992); Scott, supra note 3; NEIL 
GUNNINGHAM, PETER GRABOSKY, WITH DARREN SINCLAIR, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998). 
 163. MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1997). 
 164. Rose, Death of Social, supra note 13; ROSE, POWERS, supra note 13; Rose & Miller, 
supra note 13; RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE, supra note 3.  Considerable attention has 
been devoted to finding new ways to govern through accountability and transparency mechanisms 
that are unlinked from traditional state enforcement institutions and practices.  See Mashaw, supra 
note 16; Charles F. Sabel, Beyond Principal-Agent Governance: Experimentalist Organizations, 
Learning and Accountability, in DE STAAT VAN DE DEMOCRATIE: DEMOCRATIE VOORBIJ DE 
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explores a change from hard to soft law regimes that emphasize 
“negotiation, trust and the development of common normative 
understandings” as means of regulating behavior.165 
iii.  Changes in the Nature or Effectiveness of Constraints on 
Governors 
Finally, some writers have observed changes in the nature or 
potency of constraints on governors.166  Institutions and methods of 
power are distributed across social space, and operate as part of the 
adaptive process of people to their social and physical environment.  
Such systems are inherently dynamic, though the rate of change in the 
system or various constituent domains (like legal institutions) will 
vary.167  Constraints in these systems—legal rules, social norms, 
information gaps, economic conditions, and so on—interact in complex 
ways, so that changes in any one may create new constraints, or alter the 
potency of existing constraints. 
  Writers in the governance literature focus, broadly speaking, on 
two kinds of change.  The first type encompasses changes produced by 
the adaptive work of actors in a system.  Much of this falls under the 
heading of gaming: any set of constraining rules is subject to the efforts 
of the players to subvert them to their own ends.  Repeat players, 
particularly wealthier repeat players, have a long-term edge in most 
 
STAAT 173 (E. Engelen & M.S.D. Ho eds., 2004), available at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Sabel.definitief.doc; Kenneth A. Bamberger, 
Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative 
State, 56 DUKE L. J. 377 (2006); Robert O. Keohane, Accountability in World Politics, 29 
SCANDINAVIAN  POL. STUD. 75 (2006); The Social Accountability Sourcebook, (World Bank 2006), 
available at http://www-esd.worldbank.org/sac; Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal 
Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility?, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: 
CORPORATE  SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom 
Campbell eds., 2007); Freeman, supra note 3; Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of 
Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies Effective? (Ash Institute for Democratic 
Governance and Innovation 2004); Black, supra note 19. 
 165. Mashaw, supra note 16, at 132; Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law 
in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); Trubek, supra note 109.  See generally 
Lobel, supra note 2, at 388-95 (describing the range of “soft law” theories in legal scholarship). 
 166. See, e.g., András Sajó, Book Review, 3 INT’L I-CON. 697 (2005) (reviewing 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand 
& Gunther Teubner eds., 2004)); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton 
University Press 2004). 
 167. For governance analysis explicitly premised on this sort of complex systems view, see 
e.g., Post & Johnson, supra note 4; Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11; Teubner, supra note 
4. 
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games.168  Various forms of power are marshaled to capture the 
umpiring institutions, and to change the formal rules to further 
advantage the successful players.169  Methods of oversight can be 
reduced, in Michael Power’s telling phrase, to “rituals of verification” 
largely devoid of real power to control.170  Both Teubner’s concept of 
autopoiesis,171 and the rich American literature on legal consciousness 
explore the regulatory implications of the way people in particular 
institutions or subcultures recreate law t for their own ends.172  Thus law, 
as a method of constraint, is caught in a “regulatory trilemma”: if the law 
is strong enough to change the culture of the regulated organization, it 
risks crushing the organization’s capacity to maintain robust, 
independent norms of virtuous behavior; if the law is too weak, it has no 
effect; if the rules are “just right,” chances are we are seeing agency 
capture.173 
A second flavor of changes in constraint arises from the inadvertent 
maladaptation of governance institutions and methods to a changing 
environment.174  This line of analysis tends to emphasize the increased 
complexity of modern systems and the obsolescence of state-centered 
forms of rule in organizing such systems.  Dorf and Sabel, for example, 
argue that the New Deal Administrative state is no longer up to the task 
of legitimate or effective governance: “[O]ur national affairs are too 
complex, diverse, and volatile to be governed by lapidary expressions of 
the public will—laws of Congress, administrative rules, judicial 
judgments—that indicate precisely how to dispose of most of the cases 
 
 168. For the classic explication of this in the legal literature, see Marc Galanter, Why the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 
(1974). 
 169. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A 
BILL BECOMES A LAW (1977). 
 170. POWER, supra note 163.  Gaming is not just a regulatory problem, of course, but is also a 
feature of politics in governing institutions themselves. 
 171. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler 
trans., Zenon Bankowski ed., 1993). 
 172. See, e.g., Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal 
Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990); DAVID M. ENGEL & 
FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE 
OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998). 
 173. The long-term consequences of this sort of competitive adaptation are grim, in some 
writers’ eyes.  Teubner argues that state-centered notions of constitutional government lead, in a 
modern society, to “a situation of intensive competition for positions of power and social influence, 
highly formalized social control, and political and social authoritarianism.”  Teubner, supra note 4, 
at 10. 
 174. See, e.g., Shearing, supra note 24. 
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to which they will eventually be applied.”175  Braithwaite notes how, 
“[b]y the 1990s for the first time, the majority of the largest ‘economies’ 
in the world were transnational corporations rather than states.”176  
Globalization allows transnational corporations to avoid regulations 
originating at the individual state level, and to exercise often 
considerable governing power with few of the constraints placed on state 
governments in state-centered constitutional traditions.177 
F.  The State of Governance Today 
The descriptive analysis of contemporary governance that we 
presented above certainly is not flattering.  The fragmentation of state 
sovereignty, and multiplication of agencies and forms of power active in 
contemporary governance, allow wealthier groups to seize the levers of 
governance available in diffuse systems of collective governance. In 
general, wealthier actors can use their resources to more quickly 
comprehend events and project power than their poorer competitors. 
The superior ability of the wealthy to operate in a world of 
distributed governance has contributed to the creation of a global “super 
first world”—a world comprised of fortified enclaves of privilege 
largely unfettered by the responsibilities associated with membership in 
a widely inclusive society.  The excluded are relegated to an ever-
widening fourth world178 of exclusion from global networks of trade, 
culture, and development.  This adds up to an emergent system of global 
economic apartheid, wherein approximately one billion people mould 
the social, political, economic, and biological realms to their purposes, 
on the backs of more than five billion marginalized individuals who are 
excluded from this vision of the good life.179  Global governance thus 
becomes a conflict over values and visions for the future of the planet, 
leading to arguments about “the clash of civilizations,”180 and attendant 
concerns over escalating sociopolitical conflict between the West and 
the rest of the planet.  A governance system tending to conflict at a time 
when cooperation is sorely needed portends drastic and catastrophic 
 
 175. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4, at 270. 
 176. John Braithwaite, The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology, 40 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 222, 229 (2000). 
 177. See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 35. 
 178. CASTELLS, supra note 7. 
 179. See ALEXANDER, supra note 21; see also Drahos, supra note 60; Ollila, supra note 34 
(discussing the implications of this system for the distribution of health and human wellbeing). 
 180. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993). 
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outcomes in terms of long-term planetary security, global health, and 
environmental integrity.181 
Thus, governance is not just in a state of change, but is seen by 
many as being in poor health.  While diagnoses are various, there are 
two fundamental critiques of state-centered governance that seem to 
appear throughout the governance literature: that “old” institutions of 
traditional state governance are no longer working very well, and that a 
principal reason for this is, as it were, epistemological: social systems 
have become too complex, diverse and particular for centralized, top-
down governance to manage, which drives the interest in partnerships, 
markets, and local participatory democracy.182  It is perhaps axiomatic 
that a scholar who turns to governance as a framework of analysis is 
dissatisfied with government.  Reinventing government literature sees in 
old-fashioned command-and-control regulatory agencies any number of 
failures of imagination, efficiency, and responsiveness.  The more the 
scholar moves towards a broader reinventing governance approach, the 
more likely she is to see the failings of old institutions as an inevitable 
consequence of social complexity.  The governance literature has a 
definite Hayekian element in the widely accepted view that hierarchical 
systems of centralized government simply cannot understand the 
systems they inhabit well enough to properly regulate them.183  Part of 
this claim is that the world is just empirically more complex; there is a 
lot more movement of people, capital, and information, which means 
there is a lot more information to deal with.  But it is argued that the 
difficulty comes also from the fact that there are now so many more 
competing visions for what the proper outcomes of governance ought to 
be, and therefore more different ways of conceiving of the proper 
business of governance than the state, or any centralized authority, can 
internalize or harmonize.  This is more than just a Hayekian argument 
about central authorities not being able to gather enough information to 
govern effectively; they also lack the breadth of perspective that will 
enable them to conceptualize problems to begin with in ways that are 
more likely to meet contemporary challenges.  So it is not that the state 
is simply an idiot, but that the state currently reflects the assumptions 
about governance that were developed within the contours of a particular 
political economy that assumes the utility of its current way of operating.  
Given that that broader political economy is now the (inadvertent) 
 
 181. FALK, supra note 14; MONBIOT, supra note 99; Luhmann, supra note 104. 
 182. See OSBORNE AND GAEBLER, supra note 3, at 11-12. 
 183. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 3 (claiming that Hayek’s influence in governance 
accounts is as diverse as Clifford Shearing’s and Margaret Thatcher’s). 
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source of many of our most pressing governance challenges—such as 
environmental collapse and the attendant spread of contagions, forced 
migration, and other security issues—we need to leave space in 
governance programs for the inclusion of different framing mentalities, 
not just empirical information.  Sabel writes: 
[I]f, as I and many other [sic] assume, there are no principals in civil 
society—not even the political parties that connect it to the agents in 
public administration—with the robust and panoramic knowledge 
needed for this directive role[;] [t]hen the problem for reform is at least 
as much determining ways actors can discover together what they need 
to do, and how to do it, as determining which actors ought to be the 
principals in public decision making. At the limit, if there are no actors 
capable of setting goals with the precision needed to guide effective 
public action, governance reform must attend simultaneously to 
institutionalizing public or social learning and allocating decision-
making rights—rather than assuming, as often is the case now, that 
learning is automatic when the ‘right’ constellation of principals is in 
control.184 
Many observers, reflecting a diversity of perspectives within the 
social sciences, have converged on the point that systems of governance 
are, after all, inhabited by people.  This is a part of a conceptual turn in 
the social sciences to pay more attention to the human elements—
cultural, cognitive and psychological factors—that inevitably influence 
the outcomes of governance processes.185  Sunstein and colleagues, for 
example, have examined how the human element complicates the neat 
picture of democratic deliberation.186  Likewise, some scholars now 
argue that there are certain cultural conditions of possibility that are 
essential to the proper functioning of any model of governance.  
Considerable work has been done to understand the implications of 
empirical comparative studies of trajectories towards democratic rule.  
This work centers upon trying to identify core factors relating to the 
interactions between political economy, institutional structure, and 
human agency that variously contribute to, and inhibit the consolidation 
of, effective systems for democratic rule.187  This work connects 
 
 184. Sabel, supra note 164, at 3-4. 
 185. See Janine R. Wedel et al., Toward an Anthropology of Public Policy, 600 ANNALS OF 
THE AMER. ACADEMY OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 30 (2005). 
 186. See, e.g., David Schkade,  Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, What Happened on 
Deliberation Day? 95 CAL. L. REV. 915 (2007); Sunstein, supra note 127. 
 187. See, e.g., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Different Methods—Contradictory Results? Research 
on Development and Democracy, 32 INT’L J. COMPARATIVE SOC. 1-2 (1991); Wedel et al., supra 
note 185. 
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governance scholars with researchers interested in the nature and 
operation of phenomena such as social capital and collective efficacy.188 
Two particularly important aspects of the human element, in terms 
of understanding how and why individuals engage systems for 
governance in this spirit of collaborative enterprise, are absolutely key: 
dynamics concerning “trust” and “hope.”  It has been pointed out that 
lack of trust between groups in society themselves (i.e., “horizontal” 
relationships of trust), and, between social groups and governments (i.e., 
“vertical” relationships of trust) degrades the form of their engagement 
in processes of governance.189  Where social groups do not trust one 
another, they will either refuse to engage participatory mechanisms for 
governance, or, will engage with a view to maximizing their own 
personal or their own groups’ benefit, for fear of lack of reciprocation on 
the part of competing groups.  Where human actors have little or no 
hope that their personal and collective situation will improve, it has been 
suggested that they will disengage from dominant governance structures 
and pursue their ends through alternate means.190 
IV. INNOVATION IN GOVERNANCE 
The widespread sense that governance is in need of change is 
reflected in the volume of innovation at the all levels in the last two 
decades.  Broadly, these innovations can be separated into two “genres” 
of reform: those that focus on the “reinvention of government” and those 
that focus on the “reinvention of governance.” 
Reinventing government involves efforts to recalibrate state 
 
 188. See ROBERT D PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY (2000); Robert Sampson, How Neighborhoods Matter: The Value of Investing at the 
Local Level, Congressional Seminar (American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C. 2000); 
Robert Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff & Thomas Gannon-Rowley, Assessing ‘Neighborhood 
Effects’: Social Processes and New Directions in Research, 28 ANNUAL REV. SOC. 443 (2002); 
Robert Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff & Felton Earls, Beyond Social Capital: Spatial Dynamics of 
Collective Efficacy for Children, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 633 (1999); Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. 
Raudenbush & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective 
Efficacy, 277 SCI. 918-24 (1997).  For a careful critical analysis of the uses of social capital and 
collective efficacy in policy and governance, see W.G. Carson, Is Communalism Dead? Reflections 
on the Present and Future Practice of Crime Prevention: Part One, 37 AUSTRALIAN & NEW 
ZEALAND J CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2004); W.G. Carson, Is Communalism Dead? Reflections on the 
Present and Future Practice of Crime Prevention: Part Two, 37 AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND J.  
CRIMINOLOGY 192 (2004). 
 189. TRUST AND GOVERNANCE (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998); TRUST: 
MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (Diego Gambetta ed., Blackwell Publishing 
1990), available at: http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/trustbook.html. 
 190. See Hope, Power and Governance, in ANNALS OF THE AMER. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOCIAL 
SCI. 592 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2004).  
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structures to improve their capacity to exercise centralized control of 
diffuse systems, often somewhat paradoxically by ceding much of the 
implementation of policy to non-state actors through devices like 
governance partnerships and self-regulation.  Many reinventing 
government schemes have been linked to a neo-liberal, smaller 
government ideology, but this category also addresses the capacity of 
governments to meet the minimal standards of good governance.191  In 
the neo-liberal version of the reinventing government approach, states 
and state-backed international institutions devolve the “rowing” of 
governance (i.e., service provision) to non-state agencies, while retaining 
a firm grip on the business of “steering” governance processes (i.e., 
specifying the goals).  The characteristic institutional expression of this 
approach is the partnership between state and non-state actors to deliver 
services previously delivered by the state.  Sometimes the broader public 
may be included in the partnership in an advisory capacity, or in public-
private oversight bodies that share, or even take from the state, the 
primary authority to oversee the workings of the partnership.  Various 
incarnations of this approach have been widely deployed in a number of 
countries.  The institutional form and mechanisms, along with the 
merits, drawbacks, and prospects for varying approaches to reinventing 
government, have been the subject of an enormously wide, and 
disciplinarily diverse, academic investigation and debate. 
Reinventing governance differs in that it takes innovation beyond 
the state and public-private partnerships into efforts to identify, cultivate, 
and mobilize governors that may act with little or no connection to the 
state.  Innovators in this realm tend to start with the view that the state 
will not be able to overcome the forms of corporate-directed power, and 
other factors, that prevent governance from working in the broader 
collective interest.192  They seek to develop institutions and practices of 
governance that do not depend entirely upon the state, and that mobilize 
knowledge, capacity, and resources that have not been directed into 
governance before.  In some cases, they are explicitly directed at 
democratic deficits by seeking to make distributed governance systems 
work for the poor.  The central idea emerging from these experiments in 
governance is the importance of mobilizing knowledge and capacity that 
has previously been excluded from, or limited in participation in, 
governance.  Innovation has been aimed particularly at developing new 
institutions, and new tools of governance, that can be placed at the 
 
 191. See CHEEMA, supra note 12. 
 192. See generally FALK, supra note 14. 
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disposal of citizens and other stakeholders.  Starting with a general 
appreciation of the potential for citizen/stakeholder deliberation, 
innovators seek to facilitate the emergence of effective governance, 
working sometimes in cooperation, and sometimes in competition, with 
the state. 
A.  Remodeling State Direction: Reinventing Government 
Reinventing government, as a set of institutions, programs, and 
practical strategies, has been undertaken and studied under many 
conceptual banners, including “networked governance,”193 “new public 
management,”194 and the “new regulatory state.”195  Much of the 
innovation in state-centered governance ostensibly has been concerned 
with achieving two goals: overcoming the government’s limited reach, 
and mobilizing or constraining non-state governors in the public interest.  
These efforts have been driven by a sense that the legitimacy and the 
capabilities of the state have deteriorated, but also that state-based 
governance retains a special claim to legitimacy.196 
While neo-liberalism has not been the only discourse for political 
reform—and, as scholars who contribute to policy debates are at pains to 
point out, is not the only possible discourse upon which to build 
programs for devolved governance—it certainly has been the most 
influential in Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australia.197  Neo-
liberalism began largely as a critique of the perceived failures and 
excesses of welfarist “big government,” which, it was posited, had 
created a dependent and non-entrepreneurial system incapable of 
managing the rigors of the new global economy.  Its program for 
“rightsizing” government, and promoting efficiency and effectiveness 
through harnessing the power of the market within government and 
 
 193. Bevir & Rhodes, Searching, supra note 9, at 49-54; BEVIR & RHODES, INTERPRETING, 
supra note 9; RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; Rhodes, Policy Networks, 
supra note 81. 
 194. THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM INNOVATING GOVERNORS AND 
MAYORS (Paul J. Andrisani, Simon Hakim & Emanuel S. Savas eds., 2002); NEW PUBLIC 
MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE: ADAPTATION AND ALTERNATIVES (Christopher Pollitt, Sandra van 
Thiel & Vincent Homburg eds., 2007). 
 195. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 59; Moran, supra note 2; Levi-Faur, supra note 52; 
Black, supra note 19. 
 196. Barry Hindess, Democracy and Disenchantment, 32 AUSTR.  J. OF POL. SCI. 79 (1997); 
Malcolm Shaw, Overview: Parliamentary Democracy Today, 57 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 702 
(2004); see EGGERS & O’LEARY, supra note 147; OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 3. 
 197. See ROSE, POWERS, supra note 13; Rose, Death of Social, supra note 13; Rose & Miller, 
supra note 13. 
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across society has made huge inroads into reforming all manner of social 
services, ranging from health to housing to human security.  This 
rationality of government has also informed global development policies 
advanced by the biggest players in international development: the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization.198 
Part of the project addresses inefficiency, and tends to pursue the 
idea that government services ought to be run in a more business-like 
fashion, treating citizens as “clients” or “customers.”  This can, of 
course, be instantiated in more or less symbolic measures, such as a 
customers’ bill of rights, but has also taken the form of substantial 
reforms.  For example, the work of Hernando de Soto has led to 
widespread efforts in developing countries to reform land titling and 
business regulation schemes as a means of supporting entrepreneurship 
among the poor.199  Particularly in international development theory and 
practice, efforts to fight corruption and promote accountability have 
proceeded under the rubric of “good government.”200  At the heart of the 
reform practice, however, has been the rowboat metaphor of devolving 
the “rowing” of governance—service provision—to non-state agencies, 
while seeking to retain a firm grip on the business of “steering” 
governmental processes towards ends defined by traditional democratic 
and administrative processes.201  Within the contours of this political-
economic rationality, government makes the key collective decisions 
about the ends and standards of governance, but gives considerable 
discretion (and funding) to other actors to achieve these goals. This leads 
to a heavy emphasis on contracting out services202 and deregulation.203  
 
 198. See Abrahamsen, supra note 13. 
 199. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN 
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); Ayako Kagawa & Jan Turkstra, The Process of 
Urban Land Tenure Formalization in Peru, in LAND, RIGHTS AND INNOVATION: IMPROVING 
TENURE SECURITY FOR THE URBAN POOR 57 (Geoffrey Payne ed., 2002); Simon Johnson, Daniel 
Kaufmann & Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, Government in Transition: Regulatory Discretion and the 
Unofficial Economy, 88 THE AM. ECON. REV. 387 (1998); NORMAN LOAYZA, THE ECONOMICS OF 
THE INFORMAL SECTOR: A SIMPLE MODEL AND SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM LATIN AMERICA 
(1996); Tor Jansson & Geoffrey Chalmers, The Case for Business Registration Reform in Latin 
America (Inter-American Development Bank 2001). 
      200.   See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 10; M. A. Thomas, The Governance Bank, 83 INT’L 
AFFAIRS 729 (2007). 
 201. EGGERS & O’LEARY, supra note 147; OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 3. 
 202. EGGERS & O’LEARY, supra note 147; OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 3.  Examples of 
outsourcing and privatizing services are found everywhere—from the British rail system to 
municipal water supplies in cities throughout the world.  See, e.g., George R.G. Clarke, Claude 
Menard & Ana Maria Zuluaga, Measuring the Welfare Effects of Reform: Urban Water Supply in 
Guinea, 30 WORLD DEV. 1517 (2002); Antonio Estache, Andres Gomez-Lobo & Danny Leipziger, 
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Government oversight of the rowers heavily depends on audit 
mechanisms, if it is not left to the market and the ability of dissatisfied 
clients to vote with their feet. 
In service of this approach, neo-liberal government has applied, and 
global development agencies have promoted, market principles of 
management and the principle of “subsidiarity”—that decision-making 
ought to fall to the lowest possible level within an organization—to both 
the management of non-state agencies that engage in service provision, 
and to government itself.204  Thus, the defining institutional innovation 
underpinning neo-liberal approaches to the reinvention of government 
has been the partnership between state and non-state actors.  Public-
private partnerships have become increasingly common at the 
international level, where they are proposed as effective mechanisms to 
mobilize and spend resources in the public interest without the legal and 
political drawbacks of bilateral or multilateral government structures, or 
the inefficiencies of U.N. organizations.  A well-known example is the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, but there are 
hundreds of others.205  At the local level, policing, education, waste 
management, water, and sanitation services are among the concerns 
most commonly, and effectively, addressed by partnerships.206 
Given that neo-liberal government is interested in maintaining a 
hand on the tiller that steers governance, partnership approaches have 
been associated with promoting innovative and varied technologies for 
centralized regulation, which are often exercised in conjunction with one 
another within broader “tripartite” institutional arrangements.  Tripartite 
structures combine quasi-independent oversight bodies (which have, 
over their histories, become increasingly open to citizen engagement) 
with representatives of the executive branch of government and upper-
management-level members of a particular service-providing agency to 
carry out a range of governance activities.207  For example, in Britain, 
 
Utilities Privatization and the Poor: Lessons and Evidence from Latin America, 29 WORLD DEV. 
1179 (2001). 
 203. See ROSE, POWERS, supra note 13; Rose, Death of Social, supra note 13; Rose & Miller, 
supra note 13. 
 204. See Burchell, supra note 13 (providing an analytic account of neo-liberalism at the 
national level); Abrahamsen, supra note 13 (providing an analytic account of neo-liberalism at the 
supranational level of development studies). 
 205. See Cohen, supra note 41. 
 206. Luz Stella Velásquez, Agenda 21; A Form of Joint Environmental Management in 
Manizales, Colombia, 10 ENVT. AND URBANIZATION 9 (1998); Luz Stella Velásquez, Agenda 21; A 
Form of Joint Environmental Management in Ilo: A City in Transformation, 11 ENV’T AND 
URBANIZATION 181 (1998); FUNG, supra note 106. 
 207. See Blanca P. Ananiadis, Globalization, Welfare and “Social” Partnership, 3 GLOBAL 
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responsibility for setting and monitoring policing policy and expenditure 
for policing is divided between Chief Constables, the Home Office, and 
Police Authorities that comprise local councilors, and some lay members 
of the public.  Police Authorities have a legal mandate to carry out a 
supervisory and auditing function, as well as to inject public preferences 
into mid-term policing priorities. 
The partnership theme is important, even when it does not take a 
fully distinct institutional form.  For example, participatory budgeting 
has grown over the last twenty years from a Brazilian experiment to an 
international model. More than 200 cities in Brazil have adopted a form 
of the practice, in which citizens convene to advise the local government 
on (and in some models actually determine) the expenditure of public 
funds. Countries such as Peru, the Philippines, and the State of Kerala in 
India, have adopted legal provisions mandating that citizens directly 
voice their priorities in the local government annual budgeting 
process.208 
Another common example is community policing.  It comes in 
many versions and definitions, ranging from a largely rhetorical 
commitment from the police to “listen” to the community or 
acknowledge themselves as members of the community, to deployment 
of police officers to visibly patrol and interact in a neighborhood, to 
what would begin to look like governance change—the formation of 
boards, committees, or other institutional manifestations of partnership 
with some level of influence, if not control, being ceded to the 
community representatives.209  More powerful, but rarer, is deliberation 
with some sort of participatory budgeting component in which the 
community has a means of contracting for additional policing services 
and coverage.210  Generally, the police remain answerable to traditional 
authorities, but the contracting community establishes their agenda and 
priorities.211 
In many cases, non-state service providers are left largely to 
 
SOCIAL POLICY 213 (2003); Cameron, supra note 12. 
 208. See The World Bank, The Social Accountability Sourcebook, available at http://www-
esd.worldbank.org/sac/essd9.swf; The World Bank, Social Accountability: an Introduction to the 
Concept and Emerging Practice. (Social Development Paper No. 76, 2004).  
 209. Fung, supra note 109; HESTA GROENEWALD & GORDON PEAKE, POLICE REFORM 
THROUGH COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING: PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
(International Peace Academy 2004), available at www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php?id=34. 
 210. Adam Crawford, Policing and Security as ‘Club Goods’: The New Enclosures?, 10 
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 449 (2006); INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN 
IRELAND, A NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1999), available at 
http://www.NIO.GOV.UK/a_new_beginning_in_policing_in_northern_ireland.pdf. 
 211. Crawford, supra note 210. 
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regulate themselves through programs of self-regulation.  The concept of 
self-regulation gets considerable, and often highly technical, coverage in 
the literature, and can be advanced by a variety of techniques.212  
Compliance with state standards can be checked by audit, and enforced 
by markets.  Self-regulation may be underpinned by state-directed 
constitutive programs for regulation that seek to reconstruct the non-
state actor in such a way that its goals or methods are in alignment with 
the goals of the state.213  So pollution trading schemes in the 
environmental realm align the corporate profit motive with the state’s 
goal of reducing hazardous emissions from the industry as a whole.  Of 
course, compliance with state standards can also be enforced through the 
traditional legal devices of threat of criminal or civil action against 
derelict providers along with definitions of good corporate and 
individual citizenship in law that call attention to the social significance 
of responsible civic engagement.214  Also crucial is the mechanism of 
governmental control over public budgets for collective services, which 
can be withheld on grounds of inappropriate civil engagement. 
The successes and shortcomings of these approaches to the 
extension of state regulatory authority across networks for governance 
have been mixed.  State supervised audit and oversight functions have 
been subverted through the gaming efforts of corporations, which learn 
quickly how to turn the rules of the regulatory scheme to their own 
advantage.215  On the other hand, quasi-independent oversight bodies 
have been subject to capture by the very industries they seek to 
regulate.216  Private governors are often capable of taking advantage of 
 
 212. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 162 (discussing “enforced self-regulation”). 
 213. Abrahamsen, supra note 13; ROSE, POWERS, supra note 13; Rose, Death of Social, supra 
note 13; Rose & Miller, supra note 13. 
 214. Michiel S. de Vries, The Changing Functions of Laws and its Implication for Government 
and Governance, 68 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 599 (2002); ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES (David 
Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001). 
 215. ALEXANDER, supra note 21;  DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14; BRAITHWAITE & 
DRAHOS, supra note 59; MONBIOT, supra note 99.  See generally Lobel, supra note 2 (discussing 
how regulated parties typically learn to get around the rules). 
 216. See Ananiadis, supra note 207; Cameron, supra note 12; Hindess, supra note 196 
(discussing regulation in general); TREVOR JONES & TIM NEWBURN, POLICING AFTER THE ACT: 
POLICE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE POLICE AND MAGISTRATES’ COURTS ACT 1994 (1997); Kempa & 
Johnston, supra note 88 (discussing regulation in the sphere of policing); FRANCISCO R. SAGASTI, 
KEITH BEZANSON & FERNANDO PRADA, THE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCING: CHALLENGES 
AND STRATEGIC CHOICES (2005) (discussing regulation in the sphere of development); Ollila, supra 
note 34 (discussing regulation in the sphere of health governance); Ostrom, supra note 10; ELINOR 
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1990); Matthew Paterson, David Humphreys & Lloyd Pettiford, Conceptualizing Global 
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holes in state authority, and, in other cases, can simply overpower 
existing state authority to subvert the collective benefit of partnership 
approaches to governance. 
The achievement of representativeness in these public-private 
bodies has been incomplete.  Sometimes community representation is 
purely nominal.  Even when intended to be real, it can be difficult to 
achieve.  Concern about bias, weakness and corruption on the part of 
regulatory agencies has undermined their public credibility, rendering 
difficult-to-reach groups, such as economically marginalized, urban-
dwelling ethnic minorities, unwilling to engage with regulatory agencies 
in processes of partnership governance.217  Too often, as well, 
marginalized groups simply are unaware of the role, or even existence 
of, these bodies.218  This has raised concerns over the limited 
representativeness of participatory structures for regulation, echoing 
concerns over exclusivity in networks for service provision outlined in 
the previous sections.219  Thus, in addition to corporate gaming, many 
efforts to innovate, in the form of fostering partnership approaches 
through implementing oversight and accountability measures to 
governance, have fallen flat on the vicissitudes of the human dimensions 
of partisan politics and social relationships.220 
 
Environmental Governance: From Interstate Régimes to Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 3 GLOBAL 
ENVIRON. POL. 1 (2003) (discussing regulation in environmental governance). 
 217. See e.g., Kempa & Johnston, supra note 88; JONES & NEWBURN, supra note 216 
(discussing partnership governance in the domain of policing); Ananiadis, supra note 207; 
Cameron, supra note 12; Hindess, supra note 196 (discussing partnership governance in general). 
 218. See e.g., Kempa & Johnston, supra note 88; JONES & NEWBURN, supra note 216 
(discussing partnership governance in the domain of policing); Ananiadis, supra note 207; 
Cameron, supra note 12; Hindess, supra note 196 (discussing partnership governance in general). 
 219. CENTRE FOR THE FUTURE STATE, SIGNPOSTS TO MORE EFFECTIVE STATES: RESPONDING 
TO GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Institute of Development Studies, 
2005), available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/futurestate/pdfs/SignpoststoMoreEffectiveStates.pdf 
[hereinafter CENTRE FOR THE FUTURE STATE]; Bevir & Rhodes, Searching, supra note 9; BEVIR & 
RHODES, INTERPRETING, supra note 9 at 75-76; RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE, supra 
note 3; Rhodes, Policy Networks, supra note 81; Sorenson & Torfing, supra note 84. 
 220. These themes are illustrated through a brief description of participatory governance 
structures in São Paulo, Brazil prepared by The Centre for the Future State.  CENTRE FOR THE 
FUTURE STATE, supra note 219, at 21, 24-25.  Over the course of the nation’s transition to 
democracy, civil organizations were active in negotiating the design of Brazil’s impressive 
democratic constitution of 1988.  Id.  The Constitution created extensive institutional mechanisms 
for direct citizen participation in the design of public policy and the regulation of government 
action.  Id.  As a result, participatory institutions for setting policy and defining budgets, in such 
domains as public health, security, and other collective services, were created at the federal, state, 
and municipal level in Brazil.  Id.  The most successful participatory structures were those that were 
given the widest mandate to coordinate networks of local associations, advocacy NGOs, and other 
actors, rather than those tasked with holding a particular public institution to account.  Further, those 
structures that have been most successful in instigating participation from hard-to-hear groups are 
51
Burris et al.: Changes in Governance
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
BURRIS_FINAL 1/25/2008  10:29:41 AM 
52 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:1 
Perhaps the most sensitive issue is whether government partners 
actually cede real power.  In participatory budgeting, for example, 
officials are not always legally required to accept the decisions 
voluntarily made at these community-led meetings, and may partly or 
completely ignore them; some programs do not devolve any true power 
at all to the community.221  Advisory partnerships, common in areas like 
community policing, exhibit the weakest (though not necessarily 
illusory) level of governance control—what might be called discursive 
or deliberative control.222  The governing potency of the community 
police institutions or meetings largely depends on the willingness of the 
police to be governed, or on the extent to which the community 
involvement function is backed by the direct authority of city or police 
managers.223  These kinds of limitations have, in part, driven the interest 
in more radical forms of reinvention, to which we turn now. 
B.  Diffusing Authority: Reinventing Governance 
We should not be surprised to find that governance reform initiated 
by the state and state-backed international institutions will continue to 
emphasize the state’s role and control: that is consistent with 300 years 
of immersion in Enlightenment analytic devices (e.g., scientific 
observation) and standards for public governance and citizen 
engagement (i.e., rational, centralized management).224  For innovators 
in governance, such a traditional worldview is a barrier to effective 
 
those that have interests that stretch across the geographical space of the city, rather than interests 
limited to a particular locality. 
Nevertheless, nearly 20 years into their operation, there has been some “slippage” in the form of 
participatory mechanisms being dominated by community leaders, neighborhood associations, and 
NGOs, rather than independent citizens.  Given that most such collectivities are not membership-
based, this raises serious questions as to whom they speak for when they participate in policy 
dialogue.  See Abrahamsen, supra note 13; Ruggie, supra note 14. 
 221. CLAUDIO ACIOLY, JR. ET AL., PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF 
SANTO ANDRÉ, BRAZIL (Institute of Housing and Urban Development Studies 2003); available at 
http://www.ihs.nl/start.htm (follow “Downloads” hyperlink; then follow “Staff Publications” 
hyperlink; choose “Claudio Acioly”; follow “Acioly 2004_Participatory Budgeting Sto Andre” 
hyperlink); Cabannes, supra note 159; Yves Sintomer & Jacques de Maillard, The Limits to Local 
Participation and Deliberation in the French “Politique De La Ville”, 46 EUR. J. POL. RES. 503 
(2007). 
 222. Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 JAIP 216 (1969). 
 223. Fung, supra note 109. 
 224. See Samantha Ashenden & David Owen, Introduction, in FOUCAULT CONTRA 
HABERMAS: RECASTING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN GENEALOGY AND CRITICAL THEORY 1-20 
(Samantha Ashenden & David Owen eds., 1999); BENHABIB, supra note 20; Foucault, 
Governmentality, supra note 10; see Hindess, supra note 13 (analyzing various formulations of state 
power); Ostrom, supra note 10, at 495-97. 
52
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss1/7
BURRIS_FINAL 1/25/2008  10:29:41 AM 
2008] CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE 53 
reform.  Reinventing governance, like reinventing government, is an 
approach with many and diverse practitioners and theorists, but they 
tend to have in common a full acceptance of the picture of polycentric, 
distributed governance set out above.  They believe that state-centered 
authority and rational central management cannot overcome the 
complexities that hobble government today.  Therefore, they tend to start 
from scratch, looking beyond traditional Western models of governance 
and asking, “Where and how else has governmental authority been 
located and exercised in the broader collective interest?” 
Those we place in the reinventing governance camp have been 
trying to solve two primary problems in state-centered governance: (1) 
democratic deficits, and (2) limited capacity to centrally manage 
normative and factual complexity.  Hence, whereas reinventing 
government is exemplified by the public-private partnership, reinventing 
governance promotes new non-state institutions in which local 
knowledge and capacity can be mobilized for independent decision-
making and management.225  There is considerable interest in developing 
institutions and methods of power that can allow the relatively weak to 
compete with transnational corporations and elites that control state 
governments.  In this we see both the strong normative orientation 
towards democracy and distributive justice, and the recognition that the 
powerful have done very well in adapting to polycentric, decentralized 
governance. 
New governance thinking, like the reinventing government 
approach, tends to emphasize the importance of institutions that foster 
collective deliberation to shape public policy and oversee service 
delivery at various levels of social organization.  But where the neo-
liberal partnership model involves the state as senior partner, efforts to 
reinvent governance often aim to develop systems that feature little or no 
control or input from the state.  The challenge has been to identify means 
of decision-making that balance efficacy and normative acceptability.226  
How can radical participatory mechanisms best be structured to ensure 
that they work in the common interest, and do not lead to either a 
tyranny of the majority or a dominant minority? 
 
 225. The literature can be a bit opaque on the role of government in governance.  But few, if 
any, proponents of radical governance innovations ultimately advocate, or even predict, the 
withering away of the state.  Government has a role in constituting, funding, or checking new non-
state institutions, and in some accounts, in helping to coordinate or harmonize the outcomes and 
knowledge of diffused governors.  See, e.g., Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7; Scott Burris, From 
Security to Health, in DEMOCRACY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY 196 (Jennifer Wood and 
Benoît Dupont eds., Cambridge University Press 2005). 
 226. See Ostrom, supra note 10; OSTROM, supra note 216. 
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Cohen and Sabel capture many of the ideas in play in their concept 
of “directly deliberative polyarchy.”227  In this model, “collective 
decisions are made through public deliberation in arenas open to citizens 
who use public services, or who are otherwise regulated by public 
decisions.”228  These deliberative bodies are, to some degree, constituted 
by the state, which retains ultimate responsibility for policy-making, but 
the state and its traditional institutions—courts, executives, and 
legislatures—change their roles; rather than deciding and implementing, 
they primarily work to constitute, facilitate, and coordinate directly 
deliberative institutions.229 The process allows local policy 
experimentation within a circuit of social learning, satisfying both the 
imperatives of democracy and the conditions of good governance in 
complex systems.230 
Much of the discussion remains abstract and theoretical, and to 
some extent reflects the long-running debate in the social sciences 
between two major “schools” of deliberative democratic thought.  In the 
domain of Continental theory that draws upon the work of Jürgen 
Habermas, the “ideal communication situation” is taken to be founded 
on the exclusion of open emotional contestation within deliberative 
forums,231 coupled with a degree of “removal” from the political 
process, especially within the domain of hotly contested governance 
 
 227. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7.  For other accounts of why decentralized participatory 
processes are important, and how they may work, see, e.g., Teubner, supra note 4 (describing 
“societal constitutionalism”).  Lobel describes the useful paradox that guides Teubner’s view of 
why decentralized and reflexive legal practices can actually produce greater coherence and 
cooperation in a governance system.  The more an institution “is autonomous, the more it can both 
reference and investigate social facts, political demands, social science research, and human needs.”  
Lobel, supra note 2, at 361-62. 
 228. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7, at 313-14. 
 229. In this regard, the partisans of directly deliberative governance draw away from the civic 
republicans of the 1990s, see, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL 
CONFLICT 56-57 (1996), whom they regard as too conservative in their willingness to work within 
the traditional administrative state.  See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4, at 282. 
 230. Cohen and Sabel reject the view that democracy is now practically squeezed between the 
market and the state.  Therefore, they reject the notion that new governance innovators should focus 
on modern ways of preserving “the pre-contractual, pre-political background responsible for 
accumulating the social capital we need to preserve our economic and political artifice.”  Cohen & 
Sabel, supra note 7, at 315.  In this, their views are not entirely representative.  See, for example, 
the work of Elliot Freidson on the importance of professionalism as “a third logic” of regulation that 
can mediate the market and the state.  ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC 
(2001).  Arguments rooted in professionalism have, at least, the virtue of being able to identify 
existing institutions and norms that may be turned towards innovative governance practices. 
 231. HABERMAS, STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 20; HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS 
AND NORMS, supra note 20; HABERMAS, VOLUME II, supra note 20; HABERMAS, VOLUME I, supra 
note 20. 
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issues.232  Habermas pins his project of the development of “discourse 
ethics” upon the belief that these situations are most likely to yield 
processes that lead participants in deliberation towards “rational 
outcomes” that are most directly in service of the broader “collective 
good” rather than merely “political compromises” that entail a “meeting 
place” somewhere between the extremes of two partisan preferred 
outcomes. Another stream of deliberative theory, which draws most 
extensively on the work of Chantal Mouffe,233 has produced empirical 
evidence to support the “cathartic effects” of including emotional and 
symbolic arguments in processes of deliberation.  In our view, it is likely 
that no one approach for deliberation will ever yield stable empirical 
findings that hold across all contexts: the value of this scholarly work 
seems to lie in the provision of suggestive “stories” for how deliberation 
tends to work in particular socio-political environments to form the basis 
of leading institutionalizations of programs that would require sufficient 
flexibility to adjust to be emerging realities of deliberation in each 
context—what Holland would call “complex adaptive systems” for 
deliberative regulation.234 
There is good news for those that would turn over a significant 
portion of standard-setting and enforcement to local stakeholders.  
Namely, there exists considerable laboratory and field evidence to show 
that individuals who differ significantly in values, knowledge, and 
perceived self-interest can collaborate to effectively govern their 
collective affairs.  Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues have presented 
much evidence in support of the contention that, while “no one is able to 
do a complete [rational] analysis before actions are taken . . . individuals 
learn from mistakes and are able to craft tools—including rules—to 
improve the structure of the repetitive situations they face.”235  They 
 
 232. Dryzek, supra note 89; DRYZEK, supra note 89. 
 233. MOUFFE, supra note 91; Mouffe, supra note 91. 
 234. JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY (1995); see 
also Ostrom, supra note 10, at 497.   
 235. Ostrom, supra note 10, at 496; see also PEOPLE AND FORESTS: COMMUNITIES, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND GOVERNANCE (Clark C. Gibson, Margaret A. McKean & Elinor Ostrom eds.,  
2000); WAI FUNG LAM, GOVERNING IRRIGATION SYSTEMS IN NEPAL: INSTITUTIONS, 
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (1998); OSTROM, supra note 216; Elinor Ostrom, 
Incentives, Rules of the Game, and Development, in 1995 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD 
BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 207-34 (World Bank 1996); Edella 
Schlager, Model Specification and Policy Analysis: The Governance of Coastal Fisheries (1990) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington); Edella Schlager et al., Mobile 
Flows, Storage, and Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources 70 LAND 
ECON. 294 (1994); SHUI YAN TANG, INSTITUTIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: SELF-GOVERNANCE 
IN IRRIGATION (1992). 
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have shown that people with limited knowledge and real conflicts of 
interest, provided with the appropriate governance institutions, tools, and 
constraints, can solve complex social problems over time.236 
The evidence is not unmixed, however.  Some commentators have 
suggested that deliberation can increase group agreement, but at the cost 
of amplifying between-group disagreement.237  The problem of how 
local decisions can be harmonized or coordinated in the larger polity has 
been discussed and theorized over, but there has been little actual 
experience in practice. 
The line between reinventing government and reinventing 
governance is drawn clearly between advisory and binding community 
deliberation, and the acid test is control over local spending.  Budgets for 
public goods are very tangible sets of resources that the state controls, 
and money is a prime mover, so using budgets to mobilize governance 
resources and realign institutions, or create institutional competition and 
even institutional death, is very important as a lever over systems of 
governance.  Participatory budgeting with binding control gives citizens 
real decision-making authority over priorities, but does not necessarily 
change the locus of control of implementation. 
A step further is what might be called “outsourcing to the poor,” 
where the government devolves part of the budget to community 
 
 236. See Ostrom, supra note 10; Schlager, supra note 235; Schlager et al., supra note 235.  For 
many years, Elinor Ostrom and colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis 
at Indiana University, United States, have collected an immense archive of original case studies 
concerning the governance of a range of common pool resources: irrigation systems, forests, inshore 
fisheries, and groundwater basins are notable examples.  They have been concerned to uncover the 
types of dilemmas faced by actors in the field, as well as the types of rules that users have evolved 
over time to try to govern and manage the resources effectively in light of these challenges.  
Ostrom, supra note 10. 
Ostrom and colleagues have identified four main clusters of rules that can be manipulated to affect 
appropriation situations in many common pool resources: boundary, authority, pay off, and position 
rules.  Boundary rules mark and control space to increase the proportion of participants that, with 
regard to the community, are well known, have a long-term stake, and find it costly to have their 
reputation for trustworthiness harmed in that community.  Authority rules are rights and duties (with 
respect to practices) awarded to individuals that are enforced through payoff rules.  Ostrom, supra 
note 10, at 514-16.  For example, a fisher may be assigned to a fishing spot subject to financial, or 
even criminal, sanction for breach of responsibilities.  Position rules pertain to agreed procedures 
for monitoring and enforcing compliance with locally negotiated standards.  Ostrom, supra note 10, 
at 516.  For example, most inshore fisheries now use shortwave radios as a routine part of their day-
to-day operations, allowing a form of instant monitoring to occur.  Given that most fishers listen to 
their shortwave radios, negative publicity about one’s breach of rules will be swift and widely 
spread, and thereby likely to be followed by a direct approach to the rule violator to correct the 
breach.  See also FUNG, supra note 106. 
 237. See Schkade, supra note 186.; Sunstein, supra note 186. 
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stakeholders, rather than corporate providers.238  In Thailand, for 
example, modest results from a government-led effort at top-down 
housing improvement in the 1990s led to a more innovative approach in 
which community-based organizations were given responsibility and 
spending authority to plan and implement housing upgrades in their own 
neighborhoods under the auspices of a government-created and funded, 
but independent, public agency, the Community Organizations 
Development Institute (“CODI”).  CODI has a partnership structure, 
with a board of government and civil society representatives, but 
primarily works through organizations and networks in the target 
communities.239  The theory is that “[w]hen low income households and 
their community organizations do the upgrading, and their work is 
accepted by other city actors, this enhances their status within the city as 
key partners in solving city-wide problems.”240  As of the end of 2004, 
upgrading programs were proceeding based on this model in 175 
communities involving more than 14,000 households.241 
Interest in direct decision-making and real control over 
implementation come together in “microgovernance”—a brand of 
reinventing governance that emphasizes the need to create new civil 
society institutions to ensure that people have “substantial and equal 
opportunities to participate directly in decisions that affect them.”242  
Microgovernance entails seeding communities that have been excluded 
from governance with small institutions around which people can 
mobilize their knowledge and capacity.243  In South African townships, 
through a new institution called the Peace Committee, residents provide 
dispute resolution and community development services that traditional 
state bodies were failing to deliver.244  In India, health promotion for sex 
 
 238. WOOD & SHEARING, supra note 116, at ch. 4. 
 239. David Satterthwaite et al., Tools and Methods for Participatory Governance in Cities 26, 
presented at the 6th Global Forum on Reinventing Governance (May 24-27, 2005), available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN019656.pdf. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 27; see also Saad S. Yahya, Community Land Trusts and Other Tenure Innovations 
in Kenya, in LAND RIGHTS AND INNOVATION: IMPROVING TENURE SECURITY FOR THE URBAN 
POOR 233-63 (Geoffrey Payne ed., 2002). 
 242. FUNG, supra note 106, at 4; Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11; DEVAS, supra note 
106. 
 243. Burris, supra note 108. 
 244. Michael Kempa and Clifford Shearing provide a detailed description of the initial dispute 
resolution program.  Kempa et al., supra note 92, at 34-36.  The Zwelethemba Model for 
Peacemaking and Peace-Building bears the name of the community in which the initial pilot work 
took place: Zwelethemba, a community within the Worcester municipality, a country town near 
Cape Town, South Africa. The name “Zwelethemba,” a Xhosa word, fortuitously means “place of 
hope.” 
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The Zwelethemba model provides a micro-institutional, technological, and resource basis for 
providing governmental services at the local level through the mobilization of local knowledge and 
capacity.  The model approaches governance through the window of dispute resolution.  It uses this 
window to foster the development of institutions of community self-regulation.  It also uses this 
window to support a culture of collective efficacy in places where state government has had 
difficulty in delivering services over the course of South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to 
inclusive democracy.  Although designed to enhance community security in an immediate sense, the 
model also develops an institutional framework that can facilitate effective community direction in 
other domains of governance, such as health promotion, education, and housing. 
The Zwelethemba model is built around the right and ability of communities to solve their own 
problems.  It has two components: dispute resolution (i.e., peacemaking) and community 
development through financial grants that are derived from state and non-state sources (i.e., peace-
building and local development generally) that are organized and conducted through Peace 
Committees made up of five to twenty people.  When a dispute arises, members of the Committee 
sponsor a gathering of people thought to be in a position to contribute to dispute resolution.  The 
gathering’s focus is finding solutions that let people move forward amicably.  Participation is 
voluntary and no coercion, punishment, or violence is allowed.  A Code of Good Practice, which 
recognizes the governing authority of the South African Constitution, along with Steps that ensure 
consistency and compliance with the Code, regulate the process.  Audit procedures, coordinated by 
a nongovernmental organization called the Community Peace Program (affiliated with the school of 
Government, University of the Western Cape and funded by international development grants, and 
partially by the South African state) are used to ensure that embedded regulations operate 
effectively.  While any dispute can give rise to a gathering, the focus is on the small things that, if 
left unresolved, lead to larger problems. 
The model is designed to be inexpensive, but not free.  Each time a Peace Gathering is held, a 
payment is made to the Committee by local governments or other funders.  Thirty percent of this 
goes to the members conducting the gathering to compensate them for their time.  Sixty percent is 
paid into a peace building fund used by the Committee for community development projects.  A 
final ten percent goes to an administrative fund for the costs of operating the Committee.  Since 
these funds are earned locally, a great deal of care is taken to ensure that they are spent on the 
bottom line of community development.  Thus, the program provides for greater security, responds 
to generic issues, enhances self-direction, and promotes human rights. 
Since its inauguration in 1998, the Zwelethemba model has been continuously refined through 
ongoing experimentation, and has proven to be robust, sustainable, and easily reproduced.  The 
model has been rolled out all over South Africa.  To date over 80,000 people have participated in 
over 12,000 gatherings in South Africa. 
In November 2000, the project was initiated in Rosario, Argentina through a partnership with the 
Universities of Rosario and Toronto, and national and local governments of Argentina and Canada.  
Already, work in Argentina indicates that the model is transferable to at least one other very 
different socio-political context. 
In the pilot area of Zwelethemba, members of the Community Peace Programme have randomly 
surveyed the area on several follow-up occasions to determine the perceived efficacy of, and 
community satisfaction with, the dispute resolution process (on each of these occasions, the number 
surveyed was between 70 to 100 persons). The Community Peace Programme has also undertaken 
an assessment of the contribution being made by the process as a whole toward fostering collective 
capital and cohesion within the community.   
In 1997, at the inception of the project, 19.7% of persons surveyed responded that “the way in 
which disputes are handled” in their communities had “improved” in the last six months, while 
80.3% indicated that things had “stayed the same or become worse.”  By 1999, the proportion 
reporting an improvement increased to 49%, while the proportion reporting no difference or 
deterioration was reduced to 35%, with 15% responding that they were “not sure.” 
In 1998, respondents were asked whether they thought that the public police were being called for 
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workers has been built around collectives like the Durbar Mahila 
Samanwaya Committee (DMSC) in Sonagachi.245  The DMSC collective 
has grown into a stable NGO that promotes sex-worker well-being 
broadly, through programs of microlending and education, but also in 
significant part by mobilizing sex worker’s power to resist intimidation 
by police and other traditional community governors.  New governance 
practices like these not only change how specific activities are managed, 
but also potentially the dynamics of the larger urban governance system. 
Proponents contend that microgovernance projects like sex worker 
collectives and peace committees enable communities to manage the 
course of events in at least three ways.  First, they create an institution 
around which resources and situated knowledge can cohere, and in 
which people can define their own needs and priorities for change.246  
Second, they reconfigure relations of governance within the community, 
filling governance gaps or competing with under-performing 
institutions.247  In the Peace Committee example, both the police and 
African National Congress street committees were present to control 
 
similar dispute problems more or less often than in the past six months.  The results are indicative of 
a trend towards the perception that the public police are being called less often rather than more 
often—46% versus 37.9% respectively. 
Similarly, 1999 saw the belief that people in the community were capable of handling most local 
disputes increase to 59% relative to 48.2% in 1998.  Finally, community awareness and use of local 
Peace Committees had clearly increased from 1998 to 1999, with 3.4% versus 32% mentioning 
these bodies when asked who had helped them solve a dispute problem in the past six months on the 
two respective occasions. 
Taken together, these data indicate that perceptions of both the level of safety in the community, 
and the capacity of the community to actively bring about these positive outcomes, are on the rise.  
The increasing use of Peace Committees over this same time period indicates that the project is 
making a meaningful contribution towards facilitating both of these sets of outcomes. With regard 
to the objective of fostering community development, a range of projects have been supported 
through community-block grants earned through gatherings held.  Such projects include: the 
building and maintenance of a children’s playground in a shack area far from any other facility; the 
refurbishment of an old home; assistance in furnishing a new day care center; and a feeding scheme 
for children, designed to promote health. 
The emphasis in these projects has been on using the services that local people are able to provide, 
thereby creating and increasing the number of baseline local market opportunities that are available 
to local micro-entrepreneurs.  Resources earned this way can be used subsequently by micro-
entrepreneurs to develop further market opportunities into which an expanding number of 
community members can be drawn.  Kempa et al., supra note 92, at 34-36. 
 245. Smarajit Jana et al., The Sonagachi Project: A Sustainable Community Intervention 
Program, 16 AIDS EDUC. &  PREV. 405 (2004); Flora Cornish & Riddhi Ghosh, The Necessary 
Contradictions of ‘Community-Led’ Health Promotion: A Case Study of HIV Prevention in an 
Indian Red Light District, 64 SOC. SCI. & MED. 496 (2007). 
 246. See Cornish & Gosh, supra note 245, at 504 (noting the success of the sex worker project 
due to involvement and negotiations among those affected by the industry). 
 247. See id. (noting that the addition of other people to the project was necessary for its 
success). 
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crime in the townships; but their methods were not useful for dealing 
with smaller disputes or reducing violence.  Peace Committees first 
filled a service gap, then began to work with the police to “share” 
jurisdiction over community security.  Third, microgovernance 
institutions reconfigure relations between the community and the larger 
system it inhabits.248  Microgovernance can be amplified by networking 
strategies through which community-based organizations increase their 
influence locally, and in upstream politics, by linking together.249  
Federations like Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI) “work 
together to support each other—from community to community within 
cities, from city to city within nations, and internationally.”250  The 
DMSC, and other sex worker collectives in India, have enabled sex 
workers to enter into the national debate about HIV/AIDS and sex work 
policy. 
Finally, governance innovators have their own version of the 
market regulation characteristic of reinventing government.  Information 
about the harmful consequences of consumer, distributor or producer 
behavior can be used both to punish bad actors and provide positive 
incentives for better practices.  Responsible planetary stewardship and 
engagement in governance can be promoted in corporate and consumer 
circles through the distribution of information about the negative 
consequences of bad manufacture and consumption practices.  These 
processes are illustrated in the “fair trade” movement, which certifies 
growers and traders of products like coffee who observe 
environmentally and socially sound production and import practices.251 
 
 248. See id. at 505 (noting the effect that the sex worker project had on the relationship of sex 
workers with others in the community). 
 249. Arjun Appadurai, Deep Democracy: Urban Governmentality and the Horizon of Politics, 
13 ENVT. & URBANIZATION 23 (2001); Sandra Yu & Anna Marie Karaos, Establishing the Role of 
Communities in Governance: The Experience of the Homeless People’s Federation Philippines, 16 
ENVT. AND URBANIZATION 107 (2004); Celine D’Cruz & David Satterthwaite, The Role of Urban 
Grassroots Organizations and Their National Federations in Reducing Poverty and Achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals, 2 GLOBAL URB. DEV. 1 (2006). 
 250. D’Cruz & Satterthwaite, supra note 249, at 2; Appadurai, supra note 249; Sheela Patel, 
Sundar Burra & Celine D’Cruz, Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI)—Foundations to 
Treetops, 13 ENVT. AND URBANIZATION 45 (2001); Sheela Patel & Diana Mitlin, The work of 
SPARC, the National Slum Dwellers Federation and Mahila Milan, Working Paper Series on 
Poverty Reduction in Urban Areas, Working Paper 5, Dec. 2001, available at 
http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdf/full/9074IIED.pdf. 
 251. Peter Leigh Taylor has described the success of Fair Trade Coffee initiatives in great 
detail.  Taylor, supra note 43.  Coffee is one of the five most important commodities in the world 
market, and is principally produced by poor, small-scale farmers in the global South.  Since the 
collapse of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989, prices have fallen to their lowest levels in a 
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C.  Innovation in Governance: Combating Institutional Fetishism or 
Succumbing to Intellectual Fashion? 
The difference between reinventing governance and reinventing 
government is conceptually fuzzy, but practically stark: it marks the 
point at which true control over decisions and resources moves from 
government to non-state actors.  As important as that difference is, 
however, there is a great deal of overlap between the two genres we have 
defined.  The programs use similar tools, such as institutional redesign, 
deliberative negotiation, participatory budgets, and information.  They 
both reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, the rejection of the belief that 
social goods can only be delivered through the institutions and processes 
that traditionally have delivered them—what Roberto Unger calls 
“institutional fetishism.”252  And both approaches are open to critical 
interrogation on the same key points. 
Somewhere near the heart of both approaches is the belief that 
tradition approaches to state regulation have lost much of their bite.  
Explanations range from a sort of Hayakian “I told you so,” to nuanced 
accounts of system complexity offered by Gunther Teubner, to the 
 
hundred years.  Millions of small farmer families have suffered the loss of their livelihoods as a 
result. 
Fair Trade Coffee is an inter-organizational network clustered around circulating information about 
coffee production, and linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world 
economy.  A point stressed by this network is that surplus profits accrue to roasters and distributing 
houses in coffee production chains, which are mostly located in the global North.  The network aims 
explicitly to alter these trade relations through certifying coffee brands that make use of equitable 
coffee production chains.  First, their producer operations must be small-scale and family based, be 
organized politically into democratic associations, and pursue ecological goals.  Second, coffee 
buyers must purchase directly from local organizations with contracts extending beyond one harvest 
cycle, guaranteeing both an acceptable minimal price and a social premium per pound. 
Fair Trade is unique among certification schemes worldwide because the buyer, rather than the 
producer, pays the cost of certification and monitoring by the Fair Trade organization.  As these 
costs are passed up the commodity chain, Fair Trade is mostly financed by the consumer’s 
willingness to pay more for fair coffee.  This willingness to pay is supported by the building of 
direct personal ties between Northern consumers and Southern producers. 
With special-needs commodities such as fair trade coffee, moral and ideological considerations are 
added to the value of the product itself.  Consumers are conscious of the participation in 
humanitarian or charitable actions when they buy a certain product over another, and are thereby 
constituted as responsible global consumers. 
Although its roots lie in the alternative trade movement, Fair Trade began offering products in large, 
non-alternative channels in the early 1980s.  In 1997, the labeling scheme was introduced under the 
Fair Trade Labeling Organization.  Today, Fair Trade pursues a “mainstreaming strategy” that aims 
to achieve rapid growth in market share by encouraging corporations, governments, major retailers, 
and other large economic actors to support fair trade.  Mainstreaming has accomplished much on 
these measures. The strategy’s most visible recent success has been the enlistment of Starbucks, 
now the largest U.S. buyer of fair trade coffee. 
 252. UNGER, supra note 5, at 6-8. 
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optimistic “we can fix this” prescriptions of regulatory technologists like 
Braithwaite, Rhodes, and Ian Ayres, to the happy pluralism of Shearing 
and Ostrom that embraces non-state governance.253  Precisely because it 
is so widely accepted, it may be the idea most deserving of cautious 
treatment.254  Certainly an idea reaches its point of greatest danger to 
clear thinking when it is universally acknowledged. 
Many regulatory scholars have argued that it is just plain wrong, as 
an empirical matter, to claim that command and control regulation is 
doomed to failure, let alone that the state is withering away.255  Even 
sympathetic readers of the new governance literature have argued that it 
“would be foolish to ‘throw out the state’ with the governance or 
governmentality bath water . . . [W]e should not get carried away with ‘a 
giddy sense at the moment among many intellectuals that the state is 
passé.’”256  Putting aside the utility of the state as a command and 
control regulator, Adam Crawford reminds us that it is useful to 
governance innovators in a number of ways, including “in its symbolic 
power and cultural authority; in its legitimacy claims and public 
perceptions of its legitimacy; as a distinctive (tactical) resource and 
source of information through which interests are pursued; [and] in its 
residual position as a back-up of last resort with regard to other forms of 
control.”257 
New governance scholarship is also at risk of overestimating the 
advantages of localism.  Local participation in governance is certainly 
the foundation of many of the positive developments in governance.  It 
is an enduring strategy in civic reform.  But localism has its pitfalls, as 
well as benefits: 
Foremost among these are domination or capture by powerful factions 
or persons in small groups, the paralysis of local groups due to 
conflictual deadlock, and their lack of capacity and sophistication. 
Circumstances of pervasive inequality and conflict . . . further 
 
 253. See Lobel, supra note 2, at 364-70 (describing a belief in regulatory failure as an 
important piece of new governance thinking). 
 254. To be sure, many of the new governance scholars reject the notion that government 
regulation is always a failure.  See, e.g., Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7.  But that does not stop them 
from pushing the state into new roles on the basis of its maladaption to the needs of contemporary 
governance. 
 255. Moran, supra note 2, at 396 (“evidence in the wider literature is nothing like as damning 
as the critics of ‘command’ suggest and that the history of command in clean air regulation shows 
no clear tendency for the effectiveness of command to decline over time.”). 
 256. Crawford, supra note 29, at 458 (citations omitted). See generally STEVEN CROLEY, 
REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS, THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 
(2008) (arguing that effective regulatory government is eminently possible). 
 257. Id. at 459. 
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compound these difficulties. These problems may well overwhelm the 
benefits to autonomy understood as neighborhood decentralization.258 
Devolution may simply give more power to those in the community that 
already have it.259  The voices of the poorer, weaker, more socially 
marginal can be ignored.  Women may be denied the chance to speak at 
all.  Those with greater resources of experience, money, or skill can 
game the local system as they can a national government.260  Urban 
settings often have large populations of “illegal” internal or international 
migrants whose right to a place at the table is contested.261  It is also easy 
to forget that local politics is not isolated from national politics.  
Urbanites do not necessarily, or even most of the time, organize 
themselves and vote as urban dwellers, but rather act as members of 
ideological or ethnic blocks organized around issues of national salience, 
issues that may reflect and worsen divisions at the local level.262 
None of these caveats suggest that new governance scholars take a 
naïve view of the task.  None of them would dispute that the promotion 
of innovation in governance will certainly benefit from a significant 
investment in research and practice.  On the research side, more support 
is required for study of the “design principles” or grammars, of 
successful governance, particularly outside of, and in partnership with, 
government.263  Research is needed, but it is probably even more 
important to fund governance “entrepreneurs” reinventing governance in 
communities around the world, and to support ongoing community 
processes of governance reinvention.  Funders and governments speak 
about the importance of good governance and strong civil society, but 
investment in general governance capacity, unlinked to a particular 
categorical program or specific objective, is still too rare.  From a 
governance point of view, the mechanisms now used to assure 
transparency and accountability too often also promote aid silos and the 
diversion of valuable local resources to filling out reports to funders. The 
resources that local problem-solvers need to fuel their innovation 
thereby become barriers to autonomous action. 
 
 258. Fung, supra note 109, at 75.  See generally JAMES MANOR, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION (1999). 
 259. Craig Johnson, Priya Deshingkar & Daniel Start, Grounding the State: Devolution and 
Development in India’s Panchayats, 41 J. OF DEV. STUD. 937 (2005). 
 260. ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 
(1961). 
 261. Shearing & Wood, supra note 92. 
 262. DEVAS, supra note 106. 
 263. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (2005); Mashaw, supra 
note 16. 
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Investment is also necessary to sustain and build on success. Even 
successful models of participatory governance – and there are many – 
remain “feel good” stories for researchers, governments, and NGOs 
unless they can be replicated at a sufficient scale to influence the 
condition of the mass of urbanites.  “When such projects function well 
and are spread over the entire city, they are always characterized by a 
highly motivated municipality, civic commitment, active participation 
by the inhabitants of poor neighborhoods, effective communication, and 
stable funding over several years,”264 but there are many stories of  
successful local health governance models that ultimately failed for lack 
of ongoing funding.265  Particularly when dealing with civil society in 
developing countries, Northern actors must recognize that civil society 
organizations in developed countries are only sustainable because they 
receive annual infusions of cash from government contracts and private 
donors writing checks from within a philanthropic tradition reflecting 
general wealth, social norms and, often, tax incentives. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Governance is the management of the course of events in a social 
system.  Even in periods of apparent stability, governance has always 
been an adaptive social process.  Today, perhaps, developments in the 
collection and use of information have made changes more rapid and 
obvious.  “Reinventing government” has been part of a primarily neo-
liberal project of reform for almost two decades now, but has gradually 
broadened into a widespread effort to describe and prescribe changes in 
governance generally. Regardless of the label, observers have 
documented governance changes in the form of shifts in the institutions 
exercising governance control, changes in methods of power, and 
changes in the nature and effectiveness of constraints on governors. 
Contemporary governance is now widely understood to be polycentric, 
distributed along complex networks.  These developments may be good 
for democracy in general and the world’s majority of have-nots in 
particular, but so far much of that good remains to be realized.  The 
efficacy of traditional hierarchical systems for governance is thought to 
have diminished, but few alternative systems for steering policy 
networks in the public interest have developed, with the net effect that 
 
 264. Isabelle Milbert, Slums, Slum Dwellers and Multilevel Governance, 18 EUR. J. OF DEV. 
RES. 299, 313 (2006). 
 265. Barten et al.,  supra note 10. 
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governance has been skewed across all collective good domains in the 
interests of the most powerful classes. 
The description one chooses of contemporary governance tends to 
shape the kinds of innovations one proposes.  Those who see the state as 
still the most potent of governors, or who want to restore its strength, 
focus their innovation on “reinventing government.”  Typically, within 
the dominant neo-liberal prescription, state authorities attempt to retain a 
hand on the tiller to steer service design and provision, ostensibly in the 
public interest.  Existing institutions are seen as largely the right ones, 
provided they can adopt some new mechanisms of oversight and 
cooperation.  Existing constraints on state-centered governance (like 
voting, transparency, etc.) are seen as sufficient to prevent abuse of 
power or corruption. 
Those who question either the capacity or the will of states to 
govern effectively for the public good, and who see non-state actors as 
prime engines of governance, tend to promote more innovation in 
institutions, tools of governance, and norms.  They particularly favor 
institutions that mobilize previously untapped knowledge and capacity, 
and that give true control to these new institutions.  Similarly, they look 
to governance tools suitable for non-state actors without either great 
wealth or the capacity to use force: information disseminated across 
networks is perhaps the primary such tool. 
Thus, the problem of innovation in governance revolves around the 
distribution of governing power across social space.  Participatory 
democracy, localism, and deliberation are acknowledged by all parties to 
the debate as promising, important and imperfect.  Devolution may 
simply give more power to those in the community who are already 
powerful, further marginalizing those who are excluded from shaping 
governance practices and outcomes.  Conversely, local groups might 
come up with programs for governance that offend basic principles of 
democracy—whether these groups are comprised of the mainstream or 
marginalized.  These questions lead on to concerns of ultimate 
accountability and responsibility for governance: where governance is 
diffuse, who is ultimately responsible when policy develops in 
undesirable directions or service delivery goes off track? 
The capacity of the global community to manage the challenges 
humanity has crafted for itself is perhaps the central question of our 
time.  Governance has been a lens through which theorists and 
practitioners have tried to approach the question of rational, just and 
sustainable management of our world.  The literature on governance 
offers many promising technologies, but there is still the human element, 
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for “what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on 
human nature?”266  The changes in governance we have described have 
in many instances been deliberate and planned, but it would be error to 
see the ferment as either a rational or organized phenomenon.  The 
challenge, after all, is not to adapt to a changing social and physical 
environment, but to adapt rationally and fairly.  Systems of governance 
can help promote rationality and fairness, but these are, in the end, 
characteristics of people, not systems. 
 
266.  JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 51. 
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